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RECONCEPTUALIZING HYBRID RIGHTS
DAN T. COENEN*

Abstract: In landmark decisions on religious liberty and same-sex marriage, and
many other cases as well, the Supreme Court has placed its imprimatur on socalled "hybrid rights." These rights spring from the interaction of two or more
constitutional clauses, none of which alone suffices to give rise to the operative
protection. Controversy surrounds hybrid rights in part because there exists no
judicial account of their justifiability. To be sure, some scholarly treatments suggest that these rights emanate from the "structures" or "penumbras" of the Constitution. But critics respond that hybrid rights lack legitimacy for that very reason because structural and penumbral interpretive approaches are intrinsically
unprincipled and overreaching. As it turns out, however, both proponents and opponents of hybrid rights have taken a wrong turn in their efforts to identify and
assess the source of these constitutional safeguards. In fact, hybrid rights are just
like other rights in the key sense that each such right emanates from a single constitutional clause. The relevant clause, however, is marked by ambiguity, and
courts must deal with that ambiguity as they apply the clause to specific cases. As
courts do so, they put to work rules of interpretation, and one of those rules dictates that judges should consider the whole document in deciphering the meaning
of any indeterminate text that the document includes. In hybrid-rights cases,
courts do nothing more than apply this well-settled canon. They expound the
meaning of one, and only one, contested clause by considering, among other
things, informative companion provisions. This Article develops and defends this
previously unrecognized single-text-viewed-in-light-of-the-whole-document theory of hybrid rights. Of no small significance, this understanding of hybrid rights
undercuts all key challenges to their recognition, including that these rights are
(1) non-originalist, (2) unduly activist, (3) unmanageable, and (4) countertextual. Even more important, this new synthesis reveals why there is errorerror perhaps attributable to the very nomenclature of "hybrid rights"-in assuming that these rights must reflect judicial usurpation because they seem, at first
blush, to be exotic in nature. As this Article shows, hybrid rights are not exotic at
all. They are simply rights-rights, just like other rights, rooted in a single constitutional provision, whose ambiguity courts address by consulting the whole
document that is the Constitution itself.

© 2020, Dan T. Coenen. All rights reserved.
* University Professor, Josiah Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor, and Harmon W. Caldwell Professor in Constitutional Law, University of Georgia. The author thanks Michael Wells, Mark
Tushnet, Walter Hellerstein, Richard Fallon, Brannon Denning, and Michael Coenen for helpful
comments on earlier drafts. He also thanks Caitlyn Burns, Jeffrey Netter, and Zachary Lundgren for
their helpful work as research assistants.
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INTRODUCTION

It is not surprising that, among constitutional analysts, hybrid rights are
all the rage. In scores of decisions handed down over many decades, the Supreme Court has signaled that multiple constitutional clauses sometimes give
rise to an enforceable right that no single provision by itself puts in place.
These decisions account for doctrines that have far-reaching consequence. In
cases that involve such important matters as the incorporation of Bill of Rights
protections, the scope of criminal-appeal rights, and so-called "First Amendment
due process," the Court has held that constitutional limits can and do emanate
from the synergistic interplay of two or more constitutional provisions.
This idea played a particularly prominent role in the Court's ruling in
Employment Divisionv Smith.' There, a five-member maj ority concluded that
generally applicable laws seldom, if ever, violate the Free Exercise Clause. 2
The Court also held, however, that generally applicable laws can offend the
Constitution in "hybrid situations," particularly when free-exercise concerns
intersect with substantive due process limits on state control of parenting
choices. 3 This aspect ofSmith triggered some academic commentary, most of it
negative. 4 That commentary, however, largely failed to dig beneath the surface. 5
'See generally Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 878-79.
881-82.
4 See infra notes 106-114 and accompanying text (collecting negative commentary); see also
William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or ConstitutionalSmoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 212 n.8 (1998) (examining lower courts' application of the "hybrid situations" exception recognized in Employment Division v. Smith).
5For some of the treatments of the Supreme Court's treatment of hybrid rights in Smith, see Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a "Rule" Doesn'tRule: The Failureofthe Oregon Employment
Division v. Smith "HybridRights Exception," 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 573 (2003) (critiquing the "hybrid situations" exception set forth in Smith); Alan E. Brownstein, ConstitutionalQuestionsAbout
Vouchers, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 119, 120 (2000) (referring to the "hybrid situations" exception as "unintelligible"); Brian A. Freeman,Expiatingthe Sins ofYoderand Smith: Toward a Unified
Theory ofFirstAmendmentExemptionsfromNeutralLaws ofGeneralApplicability,66 MO. L. REV.
9, 52 (2001) (describing the hybrid-rights approach used in Smith as "conceptually flawed"); Eugene
Gressman & Angela C. Cannella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
65, 90 (1996) (noting that "the new hybridized grouping of constitutional provisions" called for by
Smith has "contours . .. whichwe cannotyet see"); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism andthe SmithDecision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121-22 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free
ExerciseRevisionism] (challenging the Court's hybrid-situations concept of rights); Esser, supra note
4, at 218-19 (viewing Smith as allowing the combination of two clauses to "create an entirely new
constitutional animal"); Peter M. Stein, Note, Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission:
2

3 Id. at

Does the Right to Exclude, Combinedwith Religious Freedom, Presenta "Hybrid-Situation"Under

Employment Division v. Smith?, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 172 (1995) (deeming it "particularly
difficult to formulate a principled if not systematic approach" to hybrid rights). See generally infra
notes 106-116 and accompanying text (collecting additional materials). The key point is that most of
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Then came Obergefell v Hodges.6 In that watershed ruling, the Court
again put hybrid-rights reasoning to work in invalidating all state restrictions
on same-sex marriage. As Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-Justice majority:
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection
may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet
in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and
reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may be thought
to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses converge in the identification
and definition of the right. This interrelation of the two principles
furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become. 7
Obergefell touched off a tidal wave of criticism, much of it related to the
subject of hybrid rights." In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts described
these treatments addressed the normative questions presented by hybrid rights in only an abbreviated
way, without extensively developing both sides of the issue. But cf Pamela S. Karlan,Equal Protection, Due Process, andthe StereoscopicFourteenthAmendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474-77
(2002) (reflecting at length on the interactions of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause
in a manner supportive of their hybridized treatment, but not focusing on Smith). One significant exception involves the work of Professors Ariel Porat and Eric Posner. See Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner,
Aggregation andLaw, 122 YALEL.J. 2, 48-50 (2012) (characterizing Smith as involving "cross-claim
normative aggregation" and discussing that concept at length). Their discussion of Smith, however,
came as only one relatively small part of a much wider ranging discussion of fact-based, party-based,
and claim-based "aggregation" in both private and public law. In any event, Professors Porat and
Posner did not pause to consider the subject that is the focal point of this Article namely, the proper
doctrinal source of hybrid rights.
6 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Id. at 2602-03 (citations omitted). For a few of the treatments highlighting the hybrid-rights
nature of the Court's holding in Obergefell v. Hodges, see Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and
Equality: The New Jurisprudenceof Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 819 (2014) (explaining Obergefell's rationale as based on the "intertwin[ing] nature of due process and equal protection"); Ilya
Somin, A GreatDecision on Same-Sex Marriage But Based on Dubious Reasoning, WASH. POST:

VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/20 15/06/26/a-great-decision-on-same-sex-marriage-but-based-on-dubious-reasoning [https://
perma.cc/VY4Q-FL6H] (explaining that Obergefell "does not clearly conclude that either the Due
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause by itself creates a right to same-sex marriage" because
its "claim is that the combination of the two somehow generates that result, even if neither can do so
alone").
8 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Wreckage of Obergefell: An Analysis of the Supreme
Court's 2015 Term, FIRST THINGS (Oct. 2015), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2015/10/thewreckage-of-obergefell [https://perma.cc/S2GE-QNWD]; see also infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text (collecting authorities). See generally Gregg Strauss, What's Wrong with Obergefell?, 40
CARDOzo L. REV. 631, 637 (2018) (noting "the breadth" of critical commentary); Eliza S. Walker,
Note, "Terms ofHeart": JudicialStyle in Obergefell v. Hodges, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1935 (2020) (discussing the reception of the Obergefell decision by the legal community).
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the majority's reasoning as "quite frankly, difficult to follow." 9 Others decried
Justice Kennedy's conjunctive treatment of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses as "dubious," 10 "flawed,"" "extremely vague," 2 "mushy,"1 3 and
"lacking . . logical infrastructure" 4-indeed, even as "[t]errible" 5 and "arrogant as hell."' 6 Other analysts, however, saw Obergefell in a different light. They
emphasized the Court's longstanding practice of "combining constitutional
clauses" and explored the "costs and benefits" of this style of judicial decision
making. 7 This body ofwork offers many useful insights. It is, however, marked
by a major omission. Nothing in it addresses in depth the most basic question of
all: Where do hybrid rights come from?'"
What is more, to the extent that scholars have touched on this question,
their ruminations are sure to leave many other legal analysts ill at ease. Kerry
Abrams and Brandon Garrett, for example, posit the existence of so-called "intersectional rights," which they describe as "rights that, when read together,
magnify each other," thus creating a "mutually reinforcing and amplifying"

9 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

Somin, supra note 7.
" Id.
12 Id.
" Charles C.W. Cooke,A Few Thoughtson Today's Obergefell Supreme CourtDecision,NAT'L
REV. (June 26, 2015), htps://www.nationalreview.com/comer/due-process-gay-marriage-gay-marriagedecision [https://web.arcWhive.org/web/20200305002959/https://www.nationalreview.com/comer/dueprocess-gay-marriage-gay-marriage-decision/] (quoting Gabriel Malor (@gabrielmalor), TWITTER
(June 26, 2015), https://twitter.com/gabrielmalor/status/614459796444606464).
14 Timothy Sandefur, Gay MarriageDecision:Rightfor the Wrong Reasons. Dissents: Wrongfor
Worse Reasons., FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (June 26, 2015), htps://fee.org/articles/gay-marriagedecision-right-for-the-wrong-reasons-dissents-wrong-for-worse-reasons [https:/penna.cc./5D5C-HCGK].
15 Id. (adding that "[t]he problem comes at the confluence of the Due Process of Law and Equal
Protection Clauses").
16 Cooke, supra note 13 ("The bottom line? That the Court had an outcome to reach, and it set up
the scaffolding accordingly. Is it a Due Process case? Is it an Equal Protection case? Who cares?
We're doing change, man."). For other expressions of concern, see Mark P. Strasser, Obergefell's
Legacy, 24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 61, 82 (2016) (describing the Court's opinion in Obergefell
as "confusing"); Timothy Zick, Rights Dynamism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 791, 856 (2017) (viewing
Obergefell as treating the interaction of equal protection and due process "cryptically"); see also Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative ConstitutionalRights, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1311
(2017) (suggesting that cases such as Obergefell "are widely criticized and maligned as doctrinally
incoherent"); Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, OutrageousandIrrational, 100 MINN. L. REV.
281, 326-27 n.232 (2015) (noting authorities that indicate "the gay rights cases defy conventional
doctrinal logic").
"Michael Coenen, CombiningConstitutionalClauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1074-75, 110420 (2016) (developing arguments pro and con); see also Abrams & Garrett, supra note 16, at 1330
(discussing so-called "intersectional" rights); Zick, supra note 16, at 81.
" See Zick, supra note 16, at 856 (emphasizing that "[i]nterpreters need to explain and defend
rights relationships with more depth and clarity" and "elaborate relationships between rights more
clearly and cogently").
1
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effect.1 9 Bruce Ackerman depicts hybrid rights as springing from a "reflective
equilibrium" between "particular clauses" and "general principles."2 0 Michael
Coenen describes these constitutional protections as "partially extratextual,"
adding that they have something of a "metaphysical" character.2' He also suggests that these rights may flow from "structural reasoning,"22 even though the
Supreme Court has generally limited this form of analysis-perhaps for the
very reason that it stands in "contradistinction to textualism" 23-to cases involving government powers, as opposed to individual rights.2 4

19

Abrams & Garrett, supra note 16, at 1315; see also id. at 1335-36 (describing Obergefell as a
case in which "both constitutional sources inform a constitutional analysis that is more demanding").
20 Bruce Ackerman, RobertBork's GrandInquisition,99 YALE L.J. 1419, 1425-26 (1990) (book
review).
21 M. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1095, 1111. Professor Michael Coenen adverts,
for example, to
the possibility of understanding clause-combining analysis in terms of viewing one clause "as imposing a high enough number of unconstitutionality points" when added to the "number of constitutionality points" another provision would alone confer. Id. at 1098; see also Porat & Posner, supra note 5, at
49 (discussing hybrid rights in similar terms). In fairness, Michael Coenen's treatment of the subject
focuses on many matters, and along the way he does touch on the "single document" principle of
interpretation that takes center stage in this Article. See M. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1111. He treats
that canon only in passing, however, while acknowledging that hybrid rights "can give rise to tensions
with . . the constitutional text." Id. at 1074; see also Glenn H. Reynolds, PenumbralReasoning on
the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333, 1346 (1992) (asserting, albeit in passing, that "penumbral reasoning" involves "a realistic application of textualism" based on "not simply . . . looking for a single
relevant section . . but . . at the overall scheme" (citing Ackerman, supra note 20, at 1426)). In
sharp contrast to Michael Coenen's work, however, this Article does not depict hybrid rights as only
"partially extratextual" and thus productive of "tensions" with the Constitution's written terms. See M.
Coenen, supra note 17, at 1074, 1111. Instead, this Article posits that hybrid rights are wholly textual
and thus not in tension with the terms of the Constitution at all.
" M. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1098-1101 (suggesting that hybrid rights may stem from structural analysis of the Constitution as a whole).
2 Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 699 n.104 (2002); see also CHARLES L.
BLACK,

JR.,

STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (1969) (arguing that a

governing constitutional principle can emerge fromthe structures of the federal system established by
the Constitution even when one "can point to no particular text as its authority").
24 For the classic treatment of this subject, see BLACK, supra note 23, at 11 (describing this form
of reasoning as "sounding in the structure of federal union, and in the relation of federal to state governments"). For some illustrative treatments of the Court's modern structural-analysis cases, see
Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the EqualSovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1133 (2016)
(asserting that, in the Court's federalism rulings, "a lack of specific textual support is actually par for
the course"), and Craig Green, Erie andProblemsofConstitutionalStructure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661,
685 (2008) (viewing rulings of this kind as based on "a vision of constitutional structure wherein
respect for federalism and separation of powers transcends preoccupation with constitutional text").
Apart from the Court's inclination to limit the operation of structural analysis to powers-defining as
opposed to rights-related-cases, there is the added difficulty that analysts have increasingly questioned whether structural reasoning has legitimacy in any field of constitutional law. See, e.g., Thomas
B. Colby, Originalism andStructuralArgument, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1297,1325 n.176 (2019) [hereinafter Colby, Originalismand StructuralArgument](noting that "[n]otions of structure" are so "abstract" that they give judges "tremendous leeway to reach various results").
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Glenn Reynolds and Brannon Denning have drawn upon Justice Douglas's
opinion in Griswold v Connecticut to locate hybrid rights within the Constitution's "penumbras" and "emanations."25 This line of justification highlights
why many analysts tend to greet the use of hybrid rights with skepticism. After
all, "[m]ost originalists properly scoff at the search for 'penumbras"' 26 and denounce the quest as "thoroughly unprincipled." 2 7 Many non-originalists likewise
25 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably
Penumbral,77 B.U. L. REv. 1089, 1103-04 (1997); Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1335.
26 Mark Pulliam, Unleashingthe "LeastDangerous"
Branch: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?,

22 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 423, 441 (2018) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484); accord, e.g., John Hart
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 929 n.69 (1973)
(criticizing the analysis in Griswoldas "vague and openended"); Ira C. Lupu, Untanglingthe Strands
of the FourteenthAmendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981, 994 (1979) (describing the majority opinion in
Griswold as a "magical mystery tour").
27 Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1336; accord, e.g., Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v.
Texas andJudicialHubris, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1569 (2004) (describing the penumbral reasoning of Griswoldas "one of the most famously outlandish arguments in all of constitutional law").
Denunciations of Griswoldamong originalists dovetail withthe view that "[t]oday's originalism... is
all about the text of the Constitution." Colby, Originalismand StructuralArgument,supra note 24, at
1298; see also Michael W. McConnell, Textualism andthe DeadHandofthe Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1127, 1136 (1998) ("The constitutional text is, therefore, the first and foremost consideration in
judging."); Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the ConstitutionalText from Originalism:The Case ofExecutive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7 (2018) ("[0]riginalism's most basic claim [is] that the text of
the Constitution is the rule of law."). To be sure, Justice Douglas cited constitutional texts in his
Griswold opinion. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. But for analysts such as Judge RobertBork, Justice
Douglas's way of using the texts is "incoherent." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 97 (1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERICA]. For

Judge Bork and for many others, too the Court in Griswold simply roamed too far away from the
constitutional text in its effort to "invent a general right to privacy that the Framers had . . left out."
Id. at 98. It was, Judge Bork claimed, simply unavailing for Justice Douglas to point to "five or six
specific rights that could, with considerable stretching, be called 'privacy"' when in fact the thuscreated protection "is independent of and lies outside any right or 'zone of privacy' to be found in the
Constitution" itself. Id. Judge Bork's approach is seen as requiring a focused attention on "each separate provision of the Bill of Rights," thus calling for a "'clause-bound' view" of interpretation. Id.;
Ackerman, supra note 20, at 1425 (discussing Bork's method of constitutional interpretation). Professor Bruce Ackerman, for example, describes Bork's approach as rooted inviewing "each clause . .. as
if it were a free-standing artifact." Ackerman, supra note 20, at 1425. Thus, "[i]n reading the establishment clause, we are to look at evidence of what concrete things the Framers meant to accomplish
by enacting thatclause; and so on, down the list of clauses .... " Id. Ackerman reports, "[Bork] draws
his line between orthodoxy and heresy at the point where the judge moves beyond the original understanding of one or another particular clause." Id. Such a view of things, to say the least, is hard to
square with a view of hybrid rights rooted in structural or penumbral reasoning. See, e.g., PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 74 (1982) (contrasting structural

reasoning with more traditional text-based reasoning because it proceeds "from the entire Constitutional text rather than from one of its parts"); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten
Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1965 [hereinafter Solum, Originalismand the Unwritten
Constitution] (characterizing styles of analysis exemplified by Griswoldas "utterly implausible" because they amount to "one long primal scream," thus "transform[ing] individual clauses into meaningless concatenations of phonemes"). This problem may be exacerbated because the Court itself has
given no serious attention to identifying a legitimating source for the recognition of hybrid rights. Cf
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take a dim view of the coat-of-many-clauses reasoning put to work in Griswold.28 Of particular importance, recent appointees to the Supreme Court have
made it crystal clear that they reject, both emphatically and entirely, Justice
Douglas's penumbral approach.29
Put simply, existing accounts of the origins of hybrid rights are sure to alienate many judges, lawyers, and scholars. Self-described textualists will be
especially unsettled by talk about "amplifying" effects, 30 "reflective equilibrium,"31 and "[c]ombining . . . clauses." 3 2 And skeptics are likely to recoil
even more upon encountering allusions to "kaleidoscopic," 33 "stereoscopic," 34
and "double helix" 35 rights.

Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 774 (1999) [hereinafter Amar, Intratextualism] (critiquing the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade in part because "Justice Blackmun seems almost uninterested in the precise textual location of the abortion right he announces").
" See Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1336 ("[M]any liberals have seemed to be far more comfortable with Griswold' s outcome than with Justice Douglas's methodology."); Mark Tushnet, Two Notes
on the JurisprudenceofPrivacy, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 75, 75 (1991) ("Justice Douglas's opinion . .
is widely regarded among law professors as fatally flawed." (footnote omitted)).
29 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to Be ChiefJustice of the
UnitedStates Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 207 (2005) [hereinafter Supreme
Court ConfirmationHearingfor Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr.] (statement of then-Judge John G. Roberts)
("The Court since Griswoldhas grounded the privacy right discussed in that case in the liberty interest
protected under the Due Process Clause . . rather than in the penumbras and emanations that were
discussed in Justice Douglas' [s] opinion. And that view of the result is, I think, consistent with the
subsequent development of the law, which is focused on the Due Process Clause and liberty rather
than Justice Douglas' [s] approach."); ConfirmationHearingon the Nomination ofSamuelA. Ahto, Jr.
to Be an Associate Justice ofthe Supreme Court ofthe UnitedStates Before the S. Comm. on the Judi-

ciary, 109th Cong. 453-54 (2006) (statement of then-Judge Samuel A. Alito) ("Griswoldconcerned
the marital right to privacy, and when the decision was handed down, it was written by Justice Douglas, and he based that on his theories of his theory of emanations and penumbras from various constitutional provisions, the Ninth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment, and a variety of others, but
it has been understood in later cases as based on the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment,
which says that no person shall be denied due process shall be denied liberty without due process of
law. And that's my understanding of it."); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to Be an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,

116th Cong. 126 (2018) (statement of then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh) (explaining that he "agree[s] with
. . Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito about [Griswold]");see also ConfirmationHearingon the
Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United

States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 323 (2017) [hereinafter Supreme Court
Confirmation Hearingfor Hon. Neil M Gorsuch] (statement of then-Judge Neil M. Gorsuch) ("I
agree [that the cases establishing the right to privacy] all grow out of the Fourteenth Amendment due
process liberty component .... ").
30 Abrams & Garrett, supra note 16, at 1315.
31 Ackerman, supra note 20, at 1426.
32 M. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1110.
* AshutoshBhagwat, The DemocraticFirstAmendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1118 (2016).
3 Karlan, supra note 5, at 488, 492.
5 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004); see also Karlan, supra note 5, at 474 (describing the
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In sum, challenges to the grounding of hybrid rights in structural, penumbral, or similarly open-ended forms of reasoning are sure to find favor with
many constitutional analysts. But these challenges, it turns out, take aim at the
wrong target. The underlying problem is both curious and consequential: Earlier treatments have missed the boat-indeed, entirely missed the boat-in
their efforts to identify the underlying source of hybrid rights. More specifically, both proponents and opponents of hybrid rights tend to assume that the
Court's decision-making approach in cases such as Smith and Obergefell was
bold and inventive, if not exotic to the point of audaciousness. But that is not
the case. Indeed, close study reveals that, in all the relevant cases, the Court
acted as it routinely acts in dealing with rights-related disputes. It interpreted
one, and only one, ambiguous rights-creating text in keeping with an accepted
canon of constitutional interpretation-namely, the canon that requires courts
to consider the "whole instrument" when expounding the meaning of a contested and indeterminate provision. 36
Why has this confusion arisen? Perhaps, it is because the catchphrase
"hybrid rights" itself has faked out critics of Smith, Obergefell, and the decision-making methodology those cases reflect. More particularly, the specialized terminology ofhybrid rights, precisely because it is specialized phraseology, may have led observers to assume incorrectly that these rulings involve a
form ofjudicial work far removed from the Court's usual approach to constitutional interpretation. And this misunderstanding might, in turn, have caused
analysts to make additional missteps, including by: (1) supposing that hybrid
rights are much more extratextual than they really are; (2) overlooking the
deep doctrinal connections between the Court's work with hybrid rights and
other well-settled methods of interpretation; and (3) viewing the Court's hybrid-rights rulings as resting on an approach that opens the door to unbounded
judicial activism.
Maybe the legal community should abandon use of the term "hybrid
rights" altogether. But the term is already embedded in the lexicon of the law,
and the key point made here does not concern that term's continued deployment. Instead, it concerns the need to ensure that lawyers, judges, and legal
academics come to understand the actual decision-making process that the
term attempts to capture in a shorthand way.
Developing a proper understanding of where hybrid rights come from begins with recognizing that these rights, at bottom, are no different from other
rights. More specifically, as with other rights, each of these so-called "hybrid

Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses as "bi-directional" in a manner analogous to "M.C. Escher's famous 1948 lithograph, DrawingHands").
36

See infra Part

11.
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rights" is the product of one, and only one, identifiable textual source. To be
sure, that textual source is indeterminate, and thus must be given meaning
through judicial interpretation. Moreover, although courts in hybrid-rights cases do consult, among other things, related constitutional provisions in the process of defining the reach of the contested clause, this approach is neither surprising nor misguided. Indeed, courts routinely interpret ambiguous texts located within more expansive written instruments-whether those instruments
are contracts, wills, statutes, treaties, or constitutions-with an attentiveness to
other terms embodied in that same document.37 Taking this approach does not
remove the need for courts to make difficult decisions as to when and to what
extent they should look to Constitutional Clause B as a source of guidance in
interpreting Constitutional Clause A. But difficult choices are commonplace in
constitutional interpretation. And in all fields of both public and private law,
difficult choices of this very sort routinely arise as courts interpret contested
terms within a larger writing by taking account of companion texts.
The bottom line is that hybrid rights are simply rights. Thus, cases such as
Smith and Obergefell should not be seen as unorthodox, far less bizarre. Rather, these cases exemplify the common practice by which courts consider matter extrinsic to the text of a particular constitutional provision to resolve ambiguities that inhere in that text. And here, the extrinsic matter takes the form of
information supplied by one or more other passages located within the Constitution itself.
This Article develops this new and clarifying theory of hybrid rights in
five parts. Part I suggests that longstanding and uncontroversial decisions of
the Supreme Court involve precisely this sort of look-at-the-whole-document
approach to addressing a particular constitutional clause's linguistic indetermi-

37

See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 6 (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION] (de-

scribing the rule that requires courts to "read the document as a whole" as "old hat"). I use the term
"ambiguous texts" both here and throughout the Article as an overarching, shorthand term that is
meant to include texts that many analysts would describe as "vague." There is an expansive and important literature on the difference between "ambiguity" and "vagueness," and some observers might
conclude that the concept of vagueness is more applicable to the set of interpretive problems that I
address here. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, OriginalMethodsOriginalism:A
New Theory ofInterpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 773-76
(2009) (discussing the differences between ambiguity and vagueness in constitutional law). Even so, I
have chosen to use the term "ambiguous" in its broad, across-the-board sense, primarily because it is
routinely used this way by courts. In a related vein, careful analysts distinguish in this context between the interpretationof (that is, finding the best semantic meaning of) and constructionof (that is,
filling in interstices of meaning left behind by) legal texts. This distinction has some relevance here.
See infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text (discussing judicial work in the "construction zone"
of constitutional law). In keeping with the common practice of courts, however, I generally treat these
two concepts together under the single rubric of "interpretation."
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nacy. 38 Particularly informative in this regard are decisions such as Roaden v.
Kentucky, in which the Court took account of the government's targeting of
materials "presumptively under the protection ofthe First Amendment" in assessing whether a challenged seizure was "unreasonable" for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. 39 Part II turns to Smith and Obergefell. More specifically,
this Part develops the idea that the Court's recognition of hybrid rights in those
cases was not functionally different from the Court's recognition of the Fourth
Amendment right vindicated in Roaden.40 In all these settings, so the argument
goes, the Court plausibly resolved an ambiguity that lurked in a contested text
by reading that text in light of neighboring constitutional clauses.
Part III directs attention to other hybrid-rights cases that many observers
might initially view as having little, if any, relationship to Roaden, Smith, and
Obergefell.41 Included in this discussion are cases concerning incorporation,
reverse incorporation, and equal-protection-based voting rights. Part III
demonstrates that the Court's decisions in these areas-decisions that have
stood at the center of constitutional law for many decades-do not differ in a
functional way from the Court's other hybrid-rights rulings. Part IV turns to
potential critiques ofthe single-text-read-in-light-of-the-whole-document theory of hybrid rights. 42 It addresses, in particular, claims that judicial vindication
of these rights is (1) non-originalist, (2) unduly activist, (3) unmanageable, and
(4) counter-textual. The key point is that each of these lines of attack on hybrid
rights loses much of its sting when one comes to view these rights, as one
should, as building on the look-at-the-whole-document canon of interpretation.
This core idea is reinforced in Part V, which explores some practical, doctrineconfining implications of the theory developed in this Article. 4 3
The Court's frequent recognition and vindication of hybrid rights suggests
that they have an underlying legitimacy. In the pages that follow, I seek to explain why that legitimacy exists. My hope is that this account will contribute to
a refraining of how the legal community conceptualizes hybrid rights. I suggest, among other things, that the text-respecting nature of these rights should
give them heightened credence among constitutional analysts of all stripes,
whether they are self-described textualists, originalists, pragmatists, or patrons
of common-law constitutionalism. I also demonstrate how all the Court's existing hybrid-rights decisions fit comfortably within the single-clause-based interpretive framework outlined in this Article.
8

See infra Part I.

39 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973).

4 See infra Part II.
41 See infra Part III.
42 See infra Part IV.
4 See infra Part V.
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To be sure, the analysis I offer will not answer every critique that detractors might direct at any particular ruling of the Court that makes use of the hybrid-rights methodology. But skeptics who challenge the shared theoretical
underpinnings of those decisions should at least take care to aim at the proper
target. On that score, this Article posits that hybrid rights, when properly understood, are orthodox, if not banal, in nature. Simply put, hybrid rights are the
product ofjudicial application of the long-accepted whole-document interpretive canon to a single, ambiguous constitutional text.
I. NON-CONTROVERSIAL HYBRID RIGHTS: OF ROADEN AND SPEISER

The Supreme Court's decisions in Smith and Obergefell stirred intense
criticism in large part because they involved the recognition of hybrid rights.44
Attacking these decisions on this ground, however, is not easy to reconcile
with an important, albeit little-noticed, feature of constitutional doctrine: In
some contexts, the Court has recognized hybrid rights without generating any
controversy at all. Of particular significance in this regard are cases that have
looked to the First Amendment's protection of the freedom of expression in
defining the scope of both Fourth Amendment government-search-related
rights and procedural due process protections rooted in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 45
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." 46 But how does one decide whether any particular search or seizure is
"unreasonable"? The Supreme Court has addressed this question by forging an
intricate body of doctrinal sub-rules. For example, strict Fourth Amendment
limits apply to invasions of the home, 47 while much looser limits apply to
searches of cars. 48 As the Court noted in Payton v New York, this distinction
finds support in "the adage that a 'man's house is his castle."' 49 But if an adage
can cast light on the meaning of the word "unreasonable," might not the actual
words of the Constitution cast a light as well? In a long series of Fourth
Amendment rulings, the Court concluded that they can, should, and do.
" See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text; infra notes 106-114 and accompanying text
(discussing critiques of the Supreme Court's recognition of hybrid rights in Employment Divisionv.
Smith and Obergefell v. Hodges).
4 See infra notes 46-89 and accompanying text.
46 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.6(a) (4th ed. 2019 Supp.) (observing, for example, "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making warrantless and
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest" (quoting Paytonv.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980))).
48 See id. § 3.7.
49 445 U.S. at 596 (quoting 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 142 (L. KinvinWroth & Hiller B.
Zobel eds., 1965)).
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In Roaden v Kentucky, for example, the Court confronted a criminal defendant's contention that a seizure of his property was "unreasonable" because
the arresting officer made it without a warrant.50 The defendant, however,
faced a major obstacle because under pre-existing Fourth Amendment law the
warrant requirement did not operate when the challenged search and seizure
took place incident to a lawful arrest. 5 ' The defendant in Roaden argued, however, that a special rule should apply to his case because the seizure involved
communicative materials-namely, the reel-to-reel film of an allegedly obscene movie.
Noting the ambiguity of the term "unreasonable," a majority of the Justices agreed. 53 As Chief Justice Burger explained:
The seizure is unreasonable, not simply because it would have been
easy to secure a warrant, but rather because prior restraint of the
right of expression, whether by books or films, calls for a higher
hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness. The setting of the
bookstore or commercial theater, each presumptively under the protection of the First Amendment, invokes such Fourth Amendment
warrant requirements because we examine what is "unreasonable" in
the light of the values of freedom of expression.5 4

Roaden, 413 U.S. at 501-02.
See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1969) (holding that law enforcement
personnel can search "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control"' without a
warrant and seize evidence discovered in that process (quoting in part Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364, 367 (1964))).
52 Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504.
5 Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority, and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist joined his opinion. Notably, no Justice disputed the majority's analysis. Rather, Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall voted to give relief to the defendant on other grounds.
54
Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504. In New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., the Court offered a summary of related authorities that both preceded and post-dated Roaden v. Kentucky, all of which recognized the
interaction of the First and Fourth Amendments in the context of the seizure of communicative materials:
50

51

We have long recognized that the seizure of films or books based on their content implicates First Amendment concerns not raised by other kinds of seizures. For this reason, we have required that certain special conditions be met before such seizures may
be carried out. InRoaden v. Kentucky, for example, we held that the police may not rely
on the "exigency" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in conducting a seizure of allegedly obscene materials, under circumstances where such a seizure-would effectively constitute a "prior restraint." InA Quantity ofBooks v. Kansas
and Marcusv. Search Warrant, we had gone a step farther, ruling that the large-scale
seizure of books or films constituting a "prior restraint" must be preceded by an adversary hearing on the question of obscenity. In Heller v. New York, we emphasized that,
even where a seizure of allegedly obscene materials would not constitute a "prior restraint," but instead would merely preserve evidence for trial, the seizure mustbe made
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This reasoning is not hard to grasp. It starts with the idea that the term
"unreasonable" is ambiguous. In particular, that ambiguity arises because "[a]
seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect to another kind of material." 55 Against
this backdrop, it became sensible for the Court, in assessing reasonableness, to
take into account the Free Speech Clause and the "values of freedom of expression" it embodies. 56
To be clear, the Court in Roaden did not hold that the officer's action violated the First Amendment. Rather, the Court declared that the challenged seizure was "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment after seeking and finding guidance on that point in the specialized treatment of expressive liberties in
the First Amendment.57 Of particular importance, in thus construing the Fourth
Amendment, the Court did not perceive itself as "combining the clauses" or

pursuant to a warrant and there must be an opportunity for a prompt postseizure judicial
determination of obscenity. And in Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, we held that a warrant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment may not issue based solely on the conclusory allegations of a police officer that
the sought-after materials are obscene, but instead must be supported by affidavits setting forth specific facts in order that the issuing magistrate may "focus searchingly on
the question of obscenity."

.

475 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1986) (citations omitted) (first quotingRoaden, 413 U.S. at 504; then quoting
id.; and then quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)); see also Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 62-63 (1989) ("[T]his Court has repeatedly held that rigorous
procedural safeguards must be employed before expressive materials can be seized as 'obscene.' ..
Thus, while the general rule under the Fourth Amendment is that any and all contraband, instrumentalities, and evidence of crimes may be seized on probable cause (and even without a warrant invarious circumstances), it is otherwise when materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment
are involved."); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468 (1985) ("The First Amendment imposes special constraints on searches for and seizures of presumptively protected material, and requires that the
Fourth Amendment be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude' in such circumstances. Consequently, the
Court has imposed particularized rules applicable to searches for and seizures of allegedly obscene
films, books, and papers." (citation omitted) (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)));
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 n.5 (1979) ("[W]e have recognized special constraints upon searches for and seizures of material arguably protected by the First Amendment .... ");
Zurcherv. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564-65, 567-68 (1978) (noting that "prior cases . . insist
that the courts apply the warrant requirements with particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the search" and reiterating that, "whether or not the warrant would have
been sufficient in other contexts," it was impermissible here because it "presumptively protected materials . . sought to be seized," thus triggering the "scrupulous exactitude" requirement); United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,624 n.18 (1977) (reserving the question ofwhether First Amendment
considerations might call for "the full panoply of Fourth Amendment requirements," otherwise inapplicable in the customs-search context, if potential government action, such as the reading of correspondence, raises special risks that "speech would be 'chilled"').
5 Roaden, 413 U.S. at 501.
56 Id. at 504.
5 Id.
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otherwise taking some "long, strange trip" of interpretive exegesis. 58 Rather,
from all appearances, the Court saw itself as simply following the age-old idea
that a legal text should be viewed as a whole when courts determine the meaning of its ambiguous provisions. 59 At the very least, the Justices themselves
saw their partial reliance on the First Amendment in interpreting the word "unreasonable" in the Fourth Amendment as entirely uncontroversial. 60
Critics of other forms of hybrid-rights analysis might respond by saying
that the Fourth Amendment presents a special case. On this view, the word
"unreasonable" appears only once in the Constitution and has a singularly obscure quality. Thus, although Roaden and its companion cases might be defensible, they are best seen as embodying an exceptional, one-of-a-kind use of
text-based constitutional cross-referencing.
The problem with this analysis is that many constitutional clauses are
ambiguous. The entire law of procedural due process, for example, arises out
ofthe Fifth Amendment's thirteen-word command (essentially replicated in the
Fourteenth Amendment for purposes of constraining state, as well as federal,
action) that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 6 ' And the word "due" is every bit as enigmatic as
the word "unreasonable." 62 More particularly, just as surely as what is "reasonable . . . in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting" for Fourth
Amendment purposes, 63 and what process is "due" varies-in fact, varies dramatically-from one context to another.64
So how does the Court assess the proper scope of procedural protections
that must attend a Fourteenth-Amendment-triggering deprivation? Among other things, the Court has often paid heed to the First Amendment's text-based
protection of expressive liberty in identifying constitutionally mandated proce58 GRATEFUL DEAD, Truckin', on AMERICAN BEAUTY (Warner Records Inc. 1970).

59 AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 37,

at 6.

Nor does it seem fair to say that Roaden reflected a bygone era during which even the most
"conservative" members of the Court engaged in freewheeling, non-textual interpretation. ThenJustice Rehnquist, for example, aligned himself with the view that departures from original constitutional understandings raise serious concerns, while pointedly challenging the idea of a "living Constitution" as "a formula for an end run around popular government" and thus "corrosive of the fundamental values of our democratic society." William H. Rehnquist, The Notion ofa Living Constitution,
54 TEX. L. REv. 693, 706 (1976). Even so, he joined the majority opinion in Roaden without any
expression of hesitancy.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment echoes this textual mandate, thus making
it no less applicable to the states than to the federal government. See id amend. XIV.
62 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1908) (noting in regard to the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause that "[flew phrases of the law are so elusive of exact apprehension
as this").
63 See Roaden, 413 U.S. at 501.
64 See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (providing examples of the varying applications
of the term "due" in different legal contexts).
60
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dural rules. 65 Plaintiffs in defamation actions, for example, must satisfy an elevated burden of proof to recover damages if they are public officials or public
figures. 66 The procedural safeguard of pre-deprivation notice embodied in the
vagueness doctrine applies with added force when First Amendment liberties
are at stake. 67 Licensing regimes designed to sort unprotected from protected
speech must incorporate specialized procedural protections, including an opportunity for unusually prompt judicial review. 68 The leading authority on specialized rules of this kind has rightly described them as embodying principles
of "first amendment due process." 69
Put another way, in determining what process is "due" under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Court has considered the distinctive concerns that
arise when government action threatens speech protected by the First Amendment. And this makes good sense. As the Court has long recognized, "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." 70 The Court's seminal treatment of this subject came in
Mathews v Eldridge." There, the Court declared that determining the "due65 See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (providing examples of the Court's identification
of these constitutionally mandated procedural rules).
66 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (requiring in this
context "clear and

convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth").
67
See, e.g., Smithv. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) ("Where a statute's literal scope, unaided
by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First
Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.").
68
See, e.g., Freedmanv. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-60 (1965) (holding that a film licensing system avoids "constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to
obviate the dangers of a censorship system," including by ensuring expedited judicial review); see
also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984) (requiring de
novo reconsideration by appellate courts "in reviewing a determination of actual malice" in defamation actions); Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (adopting a specialized burden-of-proof-shifting methodology for mixed-motive speech cases); Carroll v.
President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968) (imposing more exacting rules than
otherwise would apply for the ex parte issuance of temporary restraining orders when they target parades or similar free-speech activities); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963) (requiring special procedural rules regarding state control of obscenity); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298, 328 (1957) (endorsing "rigorous standards of review" in incitement-related Smith Act cases). See
generally Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) (plurality opinion) (noting that "we have
often held some procedures . .. to be constitutionally required in proceedings that may penalize protected speech"); Robert P. Faulkner, Evidence ofFirstAmendmentActivity at Trial: The Articulation
of a HigherEvidentiary Standard,42 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13 (1994) (noting that First Amendment due
process applies in "numerous areas"); Henry P. Monaghan, FirstAmendment "Due Process," 83
HARv. L. REV. 518, 518 (1970) (observing that "[t]he Court has found itself developing a comprehensive system of 'procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system"' (quoting Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58)).
69 Monaghan, supra note 68, at 519.
70 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
71 See 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
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ness" of procedural protections requires a judicial balancing of multiple considerations, beginning with the "private interest that will be affected" by the
challenged government action. 72Without question, a variety of considerations
should factor into gauging the salience of the relevant "private interest" at
stake in any particular case. But one consideration that seems obviously worthy ofjudicial attention is whether the Constitution itself singles out the relevant interest as deserving of special recognition. And that is exactly what the
Court has concluded in its wide-ranging First Amendment due process jurisprudence. 73
Speiser v Randall 4 illustrates this point. That case arose because California afforded a tax exemption to military veterans, but denied the exemption to
veterans who so aggressively advocated an overthrow of the government that
their speech became susceptible to prohibition notwithstanding the First
Amendment. 75 In addition, governing statutes provided that "throughout the
judicial and administrative proceedings the burden lies on the taxpayer of persuading the assessor, or the court, that he falls outside the class denied the tax
exemption." 76 The Court in Speiser accepted the proposition that the state
could exclude the identified class of veterans from eligibility for the exemption
despite the First Amendment-not surprisingly, because the statutory definition of members of the disadvantaged group focused directly on the constitu-

72

As more fully stated in Mathews:
[Ojur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Id. at 334-35.
73 To be sure, the Court itself has not always spoken of the protections discussed here as emerging from the Due Process Clause. To the contrary, it sometimes has not specifically identified their
source, and it sometimes has suggested that they are attributable to the First Amendment. But this
point makes no difference for purposes of the analysis put forward here. The First Amendment's reference to "the freedom of speech," after all, is itself deeply ambiguous. In giving meaning to that
provision, it thus is no less appropriate to look to the textual protections of procedural "due process"
than it is to look to the Free Speech Clause in defining the contours of procedural "due process." Both
roads lead to the same place, and each road is built upon a single provision's underlying linguistic
opaqueness.
74 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
75 Id. at 514-16.
76 Id. at 522.
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tionally unprotected character of their expressive activity.77 Thus, the only
question presented by the case was "whether this allocation of the burden of
proof, on an issue concerning freedom of speech, falls short of the requirements of due process." 78 The key point for present purposes is that, in thereafter identifying the "requirements of due process" as to the burden-of-proof
question, the Court focused directly on ensuring adequate protection of
"speech which the Constitution makes free." 79
In the end, the Court concluded that "the entire statutory procedure, by
placing the burden of proof on the claimants, violated the requirements of due
process." 8 0 To be sure, the state, as a rule, could "regulate procedures under
which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and
the burden of persuasion." 8 ' In addition, "the fairness of placing the burden of
proof on the taxpayer in most circumstances is recognized" by governing
law. 82 But the Court in Speiser nonetheless insisted-in terms directly portending the private-rights component of the Mathews test"3-that "the more important the rights at stake the more important must be the procedural safeguards surrounding those rights."8 4 And the circumstances ofthis case dictated
that the state-and not the taxpayer-had to bear the burden of persuasion because "the transcendent value of speech is involved,"8 5 and the state's rules
thus raised a threat to "constitutionally protected rights . . . which we value
most highly."1 6
The bottom line is clear: In grappling with the textual question of what
process qualified as "due" for Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
purposes, the Court in Speisertook account of the First Amendment. The majority in that case, in effect, went down exactly the same analytical pathway
that a very different set of Justices would later travel in Roaden. 87 In both in77

Id. at 519-20; see also id. at 542 (Clark, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that denying
tax exemptions to veterans whose anti-government speech is criminally punishable would not run
afoul of the First Amendment).
78 Id. at 523 (majority opinion).
79 Id. at 526.
80
Id. at 529.
8
Id. at 523 (adding that the state ordinarily has broad discretion inthis regard unless its choice of
rules "offends some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscious of ourpeople as to be
ranked as fundamental" (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
82 Id. at 524-25.
83 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
84 Speiser, 357 U.S. at 520-21.
85 Id. at 526.
86 Id. at 521; see also id. at 528-29 ("[W]hen the constitutional right to
speak is sought to be
deterred by a State's general taxing program due process demands that the speech be unencumbered
until the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition.").
87 Notably, there was only one dissenter in Speiser v. Randall. Id. at 538 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Six Justices joined the majority opinion, whichwas authored by Justice Brennan. Id. at 514 (majority
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stances-one involving the meaning ofthe word "unreasonable" in the Fourth
Amendment and the other involving the meaning of the word "due" in the Fourteenth Amendment-the Court did not hesitate to look to the First Amendment
and the values it reflects to find one source of interpretive guidance.
The key point to be extracted from Speiser, Roaden, and their progeny is
this: One well-accepted form of rights-related hybridism involves nothing
more than resolving an ambiguity in a particular constitutional clause by considering, among other things, relevant language located elsewhere in the same
document. And that is as it should be because this approach honors, rather than
dishonors, the text of the Constitution.
Indeed, it honors that text in three ways. First, this methodology directs
attention to the dictates of a particular textual command set forth in the Constitution. Second, this methodology honestly acknowledges the ambiguity that
inheres in that textual passage. Finally, this methodology does not call on
courts to look hither and yon for interpretive guidance, but instead directs them
to seek guidance in the text of the Constitution itself. This last step comports
with longstanding rules of statutory, contract, and trust and will interpretation,
as well as other forms of interpretation, because it directs judges to consider
"the instrument as a whole" as they labor to resolve clause-specific ambiguities."" And courts, including the Supreme Court, have not hesitated to apply
this interpretive principle in a wide variety of contexts over many years. 89
In light of this history, there is no apparent reason to question the Court's
consideration of the First Amendment in interpreting the word "unreasonable"
in the Fourth Amendment or the word "due" in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The First Amendment, after all, is most assuredly a part of the
whole instrument that is the Constitution, within which the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments are enshrined.
Indeed, this look-at-the-whole-document way of dealing with textual ambiguities will strike many observers as uncontroversial-just as it struck the
Court itself as uncontroversial in both Speiser and Roaden. Yet once this style
of ambiguity-informing hybridism is accepted as legitimate, thoughtful analysts must consider its implications in assessing other cases in which the Court
has recognized hybrid rights. Close analysis along these lines ends up giving
rise to critical conclusion: It reveals that what might seem at first glance to be
opinion). Justice Burton concurred only in the result (without explaining why), and Chief Justice Warren did not participate in the case. See id. at 529; see also id. at 532 (Black, J., concurring, joined by
Douglas, J.) (expressing "full agreement" with the majority that, if the state "may tax the expression
of certain views," then "the procedures it has provided . . violate the requirements of due process").
" See Markmanv. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996) (describing this approach as
a "standard construction rule").
89 See infra notes 240, 249 and accompanying text.
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very different forms of interpretive hybridism-in particular, the oft-maligned
techniques of constitutional decision making put to work in Smith and Obergefell-turn out to involve exactly the same form of interpretive hybridism that
the Court put to work in its long-accepted rulings in Speiser and Roaden.
II. CONTROVERSIAL HYBRID RIGHTS: OF SMITH AND

OBERGEFELL

As detailed earlier, Smith and Obergefell triggered intense criticism of the
Supreme Court's reliance in those cases on hybrid-rights-based reasoning. Part
I also shows, however, that the recognition of hybrid rights in cases such as
Speiser and Roaden triggered no controversy at all. This Part explores whether
the very different receptions these different pairs of cases have received makes
sense as a matter of logically consistent legal analysis. On this point, this Part
shows that in fact the analytical approach taken in both sets of cases was, on
close inspection, exactly the same. More specifically, in all these cases, the
Court's recognition of hybrid rights comported with the longstanding and noncontroversial judicial practice of looking at the whole document in interpreting
ambiguous clauses that the document includes. 90
In Speiser and Roaden, the Court relied on the protection of freedom of
expression lodged in the First Amendment in interpreting other rights-creating
clauses of the Constitution. The First Amendment, however, does not safeguard only communicative liberty. It also bars the government from enacting
laws "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. 91 This text gives rise to a vexing conundrum: How should courts deal with facially neutral laws, enacted
with no hostility to religion, when they operate in particular instances to punish
conduct undertaken in an effort to comply with the dictates of one's faith? 92
The Court grappled with this question in Smith. 93
The specific issue presented in that case was whether the state could enforce a broad ban on peyote use against a sincere religious practitioner who
ingested the substance as a sacramental act. 94 A five-Justice majority concluded that the First Amendment did not stand in the way of applying the statutory
prohibition, even to send the peyote user to prison, notwithstanding the severe
burden it placed on religiously motivated behavior in these particular circumstances. 95 The essential reason offered for this result had its roots in the constitutional text. As Justice Scalia explained for the Court, it was wrong to say that
90

See infra notes 91-148 and accompanying text.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 5, at 1111 (noting this issue and its
significance to free-exercise law).
93 Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
94 Id. at 874.
95 Id. at 882.
91
92
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such a generally applicable ban "prohibit[s]" the free exercise of religion when
it was not meant to target religious practices at all. 96
To reach this result, however, the Court had to navigate its way around a
major obstacle. The problem was that, from all appearances, the Court already
had rejected this very interpretive position in earlier free-exercise cases. Most
notably, in Wisconsin v Yoder, the Court confronted a challenge to a generally
applicable state statute that required children younger than sixteen to attend
school. 97 The attack on this law did not come, however, from a truantstudent.
Instead, the challengers were Amish parents whose faith required them to put
their children to work during the day on the family farm, and thus remove
them from school, even though those children were not yet sixteen. 98 The
Court in Yoder recognized the obvious-namely, that this compulsory education law was generally applicable because it neither reflected hostility toward
religion nor singled out sectarians for disadvantageous treatment. 99 Even so,
the Court subjected the law to strict scrutiny and held that the state's interest in
fostering educational proficiency did not "overbalance legitimate claims to the
free exercise of religion" that the Amish parents asserted. 00
Not surprisingly, the challenger of the peyote law in Smith relied heavily
on Yoder, and Justice Scalia had no choice but to deal with that precedent as he
fashioned his opinion. He did so in the following terms:

'

The only decisions in which we have held that the FirstAmendment
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone,
but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and ofthe press, or the rights
of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society ofSisters, to direct the
education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder.' 0
According to Justice Scalia, Smith itself "d[id] not present such a hybrid situation." 0 2 Instead, it involved "a free exercise claim unconnected with any
communicative activity or parental right."103 Thus, he concluded, Yoder was
beside the point. 4

96

Id. at 879-81.

97 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
98

Id. at 207.

99 Id. at 220.

loo Id. at 215, 234-36.
1 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citations omitted).
102
Id. at 882.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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'

The Court in Smith in effect reclassified Yoder as a case that implicated
not only the Free Exercise Clause, but both free-exercise and substantive due
process, right-to-parent concerns. 5 This reclassification, however, proved to
be highly controversial. Many observers criticized the Court's case-distinguishing maneuver as inconsistent with the reasoning of Yoder itself.1 06 One
leading authority went so far as to suggest that Justice Scalia did not really believe what he wrote about Yoder in his Smith opinion.1 07 But the words are now
there on the pages of the United States Reports, and those words did not embody some offhand dictum. Instead, they set forth a key aspect of the majority's treatment of a potentially controlling precedent as it worked its way toward issuing a seminal constitutional ruling.
The Court in Smith could have overruled Yoder. But it chose not to. Rather, it declared that Yoder involved a "hybrid situation," in which the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause was rightly seen as acting "in conjunction
with" the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In short, these two
provisions gave rise to a constitutional right that lacked support in the Free
Exercise Clause standing alone. 08
Smith's treatment of Yoder illustrates, in a powerful way, the Court's endorsement of the concept of hybrid rights. But what kind of hybrid rights?
Many observers have decried Smith's treatment of Yoder as reflecting a dramatic and extraordinary analytical move. For them, the Court's action was so
"illogical" 09 and "impenetrable" 1O that it left only "bafflement" in its wake."
The image brought to mind is one of Harry Potter-like wizards, clad in judicial
robes, magically levitating two separate texts off the pages of the Constitution,
and then causing them to whirl about until their gyrations mystically produce a

105 See id. at 881-82.
106 E.g., McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 5, at 1120 (discussing
the precedent
of generalized free-exercise protection established in Yoder and noting that until Smith the Court consistently followed it). It might also be argued that, even under this hybrid-rights approach, the religious practitioner involved in Smith itself should have prevailed in that case on the theory that engaging in a shared sacrament simultaneously involves the participant in both religious conduct and a
communicative activity within the orbit of the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 1122. The Court in Smith,
however, did not pause to address this line of argument.
107 See id. at 1121 (suggesting "that the notion of 'hybrid' claims was created for the sole purpose
of distinguishing Yoder").
108 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
109 Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
110 Hicks ex rel. Hicks v. Halifax Cty. Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 661 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
"11 Kyle Still, Comment, Smith'sHybridRightsDoctrine andthe Pierce Right: An Unintelligent
Design, 85 N.C. L. REV. 385, 409 (2006).
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third, freestanding, non-text-based doctrine destined to lurk in the document's

"penumbras." 112
Critics of Smith's treatment of Yoder challenge this seemingly hocuspocus approach to rights. They argue that combining a non-right under the
Free Exercise Clause and a non-right under the Due Process Clause cannot
somehow produce a new right not lodged in either clause standing alone."1 3
The treatment of hybrid rights in Smith, they say, does not add up because it
cannot be that "zero plus zero equals one."" 4
Others see things a different way. According to them, courts sometimes
should "combine the clauses" so as to recognize rights not established by any
single constitutional mandate in and of itself." 5 As one of them has explained:
"Just as my limited desire to see a movie and my limited desire to buy clothes
might together yield an overwhelming desire to go to the mall, so too might
clauses providing limited individual support for a judicial result operate together to generate strong collective support for that result.""1 6
This way of looking at existing law finds some support in the past rhetoric and rulings of the Court. For example, the Court's horizontal and vertical
separation-of-powers jurisprudence suggests that constitutional rules can find
their origins in the "structures" of the Constitution, as opposed to its discrete
textual passages." 7 And ifthe Court can find rules regarding "states' rights" in
the Constitution's structures, why not individual rights as well? An additional
point is that the Court often speaks of honoring "constitutional values," thus
suggesting that specific words in a specific clause may be less significant than
12 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. The idea of levitation connects with the not
uncommon (and pejorative) description of some judicially recognized rights as "free-floating." BORK,
TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 27, at 120.
113 See, e.g., Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 661 (expressing skepticism with respect to the logic of the
Court's hybrid-rights analysis in Smith); see also Stein, supra note 5, at 174 (collecting sources that
criticize Smith's hybrid-rights exception and adding that it operates as a "Hamburger Helper" decisional rule insofar as the Free Exercise Clause "only has meaning when combined with another constitutional interest").
114 Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and HybridReligious Exemptions, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1494, 1505 (2010); accordEsser, supra note 4, at 218-19 (questioning the idea that "two losers
equal one winner"). In a similar vein, see Abrams & Garrett, supra note 16, at 1314 (positing that
"two half violations do not make a whole").
15 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (collecting the authorities).
116 M. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1092 (footnote omitted); see also Richard F. Duncan,
Who
Wants to Stop the Church: HomosexualRights Legislation, PublicPolicy, andReligious Freedom, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 430-31 (1994) ("Clearly, what the Court must have meant [in Smith] is
that a less than sufficient free exercise claim, plus a less than sufficient claim arising under a different
part of the Constitution, together trigger the compelling interest test.").
"' See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) ("We turn next to consideration of
the structure of the Constitution, to see if we can discern among its 'essential postulate[s]' a principle
that controls the present cases." (citation omitted) (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313, 332 (1934))).
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principles or themes given impetus by constitutional texts.I" Drawing on these
past judicial practices, perhaps the Court should not hesitate to construct
rights-creating rules by aggregating multiple values borne of multiple clauses.
One might even say that an "anomaly" will arise if a losing litigant's case implicates constitutional value A at the ninety-nine percent level and constitutional value B at the ninety-nine percent level, although a winning litigant's
case implicates only constitutional value A at a level just barely exceeding one
hundred percent. 119
As we have seen, however, there is a major problem with justifying hybrid rights in this way-namely, that rationales of this sort are sure to drive
away most analysts who view themselves as high-specificity, and perhaps even
low-specificity, constitutional textualists. For text-centered thinkers after all,
arguments based on constitutional structures and values, whatever meaning
one gives to those terms, are deeply different from, and far more problematic
than, arguments rooted in the Constitution's actual declarative commands. 2 0
Likewise, arguments about avoiding anomalous results will themselves strike
many observers as anomalous if those arguments stray away from the constitutional text itself. In short, existing arguments in favor of hybrid rights, however
attractive they may be to some analysts, are likely to alienate many others, especially analysts drawn to the core idea that "[w]hat matters . . . is what the
constitutional text says."'I2 As a result, a key question arises: Is there any textualist basis for the Court's treatment of Yoder in Smith?
The answer is yes. We saw in Part I that there was and is a sound textualist basis for the Court's rulings in Roaden and Speiser.2 2 In the former case,
the Court deemed it uncontroversial to look in part to the Free Speech Clause

"8 Schnecklothv. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 (1973) (quoting Tehanv. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966)). In the same vein, the Court sometimes recognizes seemingly nontextual "prophylactic" rules that is, rules not so much rooted in the text itself as in the goal of ensuring that a right more readily connected to the text is not undermined as a practical matter. See, e.g.,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 462-71 (1966) (establishing prophylactic warning rules to safeguard the right against self-incrimination); see also David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity ofProphylactic
Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 195 (1988) ("'Prophylactic' rules are, in an important sense, the norm,
not the exception. Constitutional law is filled with rules that are justified in [this] way[] .... ").
119 See M. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1101-04 (developing this idea); see also Mark Tushnet,
PublicandPrivateEducation:Is There a ConstitutionalDifference?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43,7172 (urging that different "'interests' related to values protected by the Constitution . . can be added
together to yield the equivalent of a constitutional right").
120 See Colby, Originalismand StructuralArgument,supra note 24, at 1314 (questioning "reasoning [that] is from the structure of the governmental system established by the text, not the text
itself').
121 Supreme Court ConfirmationHearingfor Hon. NeilM. Gorsuch, supra note 29, at 2 (statement of Lawrence B. Solum, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center).
122 See supra Part I.
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in giving meaning to the term "unreasonable" in the Fourth Amendment.1 23 In
the latter case, the Court likewise did not hesitate to consider the First
Amendment in deciding what process was "due" for procedural due process
purposes. 24
So, what about the so-called substantive due process, parenting-related
rights brought into view by Smith and Yoder? The idea that the Due Process
Clauses protect substantive values is anathema for some text-minded constitutional analysts. 25 Whether they like it or not, however, their view on this matter has not prevailed.1 26 Members ofthe Court, spanning many years and many
outlooks-including John Roberts, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh-have
recognized that substantive due process is an accepted feature of the constitutional landscape. 27 There are, no doubt, many ways to define the nature and
scope of substantive due process protections. But a shorthand formulation of
the Court's past work might well go something like this: The textual prohibition on deprivations "without due process of law" dictates that the government
may not take away one's life, liberty, or property in a way that rises to the level
of being "fundamentally unfair."1 28

123 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
125 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18

(1980) ("'[Slubstantive due process' is a contradiction interms sort of like 'green pastel redness."');
Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 16, at 310 n.154 (noting Justice Thomas's argument along these
lines for not incorporating substantive rights into the Due Process Clause and Justice Scalia's position
that the Due Process Clause, if it were properly interpreted, would not protect substantive, as opposed
to procedural, rights).
126
Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 16, at 282 (noting that, despite criticisms, the "existence and
function" of substantive due process rights "are broadly accepted").
127 See generally supra note 29 and accompanying text (collecting statements made by these
Justices on this point at their confirmation hearings). Illustrative is the statement of then-Judge John
Roberts: "I think there is a right to privacy protected as part of the liberty guarantee in the Due Process Clause," in keeping with the idea that the Clause operates "not simply procedurally." Supreme
Court ConfirmationHearingfor Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr., supra note 29, at 147, 372. Other Justices,
of many ideological stances, have endorsed this same position. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example,
pointed to the Due Process Clause in asserting that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from
our prior decisions." Cruzanv. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); see also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Griswoldstands as one in a long line
of . . cases decided under the doctrine of substantive due process, and I now accept it as such ....
Clearly, therefore, the Court today is correct in holding that the right asserted by Jane Roe is embraced
within the personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
128 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976); see, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
431-32 (1973) (rejecting defendant's claim of unconstitutional entrapment because government
agents did not act inconsistently with "fundamental fairness" as required to establish a Due Process
Clause violation). More particularly, as to substantive rights, this formulation is meant to capture, in a
shorthand way, the commonly stated proposition that the Due Process Clause safeguards such rights
if, but only if, they qualify as "fundamental." See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
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It bears noting that this prohibition on fundamentally unfair deprivations
is not any more amorphous than a number of text-based restrictions set forth in
the Constitution itself-a point well-illustrated by the Fourth Amendment
touchstone of "unreasonable" state behavior.1 29 In addition, the substantive due
process principle has stronger historical moorings than many of its critics recognize.1 30 No less important, precisely because this principle has operated
within constitutional law for so long, it has generated a body of doctrine that
serves to shape and limit the range of cognizable substantive due process

rights. 131
All ofthis brings us back to Smith and Yoder. As we have seen, many analysts view Smith's treatment of Yoder as a textual embarrassment.1 32 But why?
If the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from fundamentally unfair
deprivations of substantive interests, courts must find ways to determine what
actions qualify as fundamentally unfair. And if the Court can and should look
to the First Amendment to help it determine whether a seizure is "unreasonable," why should it not do the exact same thing in interpreting the Constitution's "due process of law" terminology that underlies the "fundamental fairness" test? Even more to the point, if the Court can look to the First Amendment in determining the meaning of "due process of law" for purposes of identifying procedural due process rights, as it did in Speiser, why should it not be
able to look to the First Amendment in interpreting exactly this same constitutional language in determining the scope of substantive due process protections?
(broadly reviewing the Court's fundamental-rights approach to incorporation on its way to applying
the substantive Second Amendment right to bear arms to the states); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 364 (1937) (incorporating into the Fourteenth Amendment the First Amendment protection of the
right of peaceful assembly because that protection safeguards a "fundamental right"); see also Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("We have long recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, 'guarantees more than fair process.' The Clause also includes a substantive component .... " (citation omitted) (quoting Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997))); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (canvassing the Court's earlier incorporation of both substantive and procedural Bill of Rights protections
before deeming the right to jury trial to be "fundamental" and thus incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause).
129
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Consider, in the same vein, the constitutional bans on "cruel and
unusual punishments" and "excessive fines." Id. amend. VIII.
130 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No ArbitraryPower:An OriginalistTheory of
the Due ProcessofLaw, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599, 1604-05 (2019) (citing earlier work suggesting "that the case for some form of judicial review of the content of legislation under the Due Process
of Law Clauses is weightier than initially supposed"); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due ProcessClause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 415 (2010) (arguing, from an originalist perspective,
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompasses substantive protections).
131 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (noting that the Supreme Court takes a cautious approach to
expanding substantive due process rights).
132 See supra notes 105-114 and accompanying text.
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Common sense confirms the soundness of viewing the Constitution's textual treatment of free exercise as one proper source of guidance in deciding
whether a challenged state action abridges the "fundamental" right to parent
one's children. Let us say, for example, that Parent X sees it as useful in fostering her fourteen-year-old's maturation to permit him to drink wine on occasion. Next, let us say that a central tenet of Parent Y's religion dictates that that
she must require her fourteen-year-old daughter to drink wine from time to
time as the family engages in the most central sacramental ritual of the family's faith. Is it not clear that a law prohibiting under-age drinking interferes to a
greater degree with the liberty of Parent Y than Parent X? Put another way, is
not the state's interference with Parent Y's choice as a parent far more severe
precisely because it strips that parent of the power to engage her child in the
deepest and most central elements of directing that child's life? To be sure, we
might reach this conclusion even if the Free Exercise Clause were not in the
Constitution. But the Free Exercise Clause is in the Constitution, and its presence there offers support for the conclusion that Parent Y's claim of parenting
liberty fits into a different constitutional category than the claim of Parent X.
To be clear, a person often will have multiple reasons for making parental
choices. It might be, for example, that Parent X not only thinks it is generally
helpful to let her fourteen-year-old son drink wine on occasion but that she
also feels pushed in this direction because other parents in the neighborhood
let their youngsters hit the bottle. Under these circumstances, one might say
that there is an added interference with Parent X's liberty because the legal ban
on serving alcohol to her child deprives her not only of the ability to shape her
child's maturation, but also of the ability to conform to local parenting norms.
But so what? The decisive point is that nothing in the text of the Constitution
says anything about the special salience of neighborhood custom-keeping.
When it comes to faith-based conduct, however, the First Amendment's
specialized treatment of "the free exercise" of religion leaps into view, together
with the distinctly American commitment to religious liberty that the First
Amendment reflects. The point is this: On close examination, consulting the
First Amendment in interpreting the scope of substantive due process rights is
no different in its nature from consulting the First Amendment in assessing
procedural due process rights or in giving meaning to the term "unreasonable"
in the Fourth Amendment. In other words, even though Smith, in its treatment
of Yoder, might seem at first blush to involve a highly unorthodox and controversial hybrid-rights decision-making methodology, that methodology turns
out to be no different in substance from the orthodox and noncontroversial approach to hybrid rights taken by the Court in Roaden and Speiser. In all these
cases, the Court drew on one constitutional text in the process of working
through an ambiguity presented by another text, thus adhering to the consult-
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the-whole-document canon of interpretation that long has guided the work of
courts.1 33
Obergefell illustrates the same point. The Fourteenth Amendment ensures
that "[n]o State shall . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."1 34 The profound difficulty presented by this terse formulation stems from the fact that all laws, in a very real sense, deny equal protection. Murder laws discriminate against murderers. Property tax laws discriminate against property owners. One might say that such laws are intrinsically equal because they set forth across-the-board rules, not marked on their
face by any differentiation among regulated persons. But even if that is so,
many laws that are not equal on their face present no problem whatsoever under the Equal Protection Clause. Property tax laws, for example, might exempt
charitable entities.13 5 Laws that render contracts made by minors unenforceable include exceptions for the purchase of necessaries.1 36 Progressive income
tax laws create a variety of categories and treat persons in different categories
in very different ways.1 37 Indeed, laws that create exceptions and categories
pervade statutory codes. Very few of these enactments, however, violate the
command of "equal protection of the laws." In sum, the term "equal protection" is ambiguous-indeed, about as ambiguous as a legal text can get. As a
result, judges have had to develop sorting mechanisms to distinguish between
laws that discriminate in constitutionally prohibited and permissible ways.
One key sorting device developed by the Court renders laws that discriminate on the basis of race subject to a powerful presumption of invalidity.1 38
The text of the Equal Protection Clause, however, leaves no doubt that its prohibition reaches beyond laws that draw lines based on race. Judges thus have
had no choice but to identify additional sorting mechanisms.1 39
Much of the Court's work in constitutional law has involved constructing
these mechanisms. One part of this process comports with common understanding. It suggests that, as we gauge whether particular instances of unequal
See supra notes 37, 59, 88 and accompanying text.
134 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
135 See 71 AM. JUR. 2D STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 269 (2020).
136
See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.04 (Zachary Wolfe ed., 4th
ed. 2020).
137 See I.R.C. § 1 (2018) (establishing differing rates for differing levels
of income).
13 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570
U.S. 297, 310 (2013) (endorsing this view,
including for affirmative-action programs).
139 For example, the Court has also deemed discrimination on the basis of ethnicity
to be subject
to strict scrutiny. See id. at 310; see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (referring to discrimination on the basis of ethnicity as the "first cousin" of race discrimination and thus properly subject to strict scrutiny). But that conclusion is hardly self-evident. Notably,
Professor Amar suggests that this extrapolation, and other extrapolations like it, draw support from
reading the document as a whole. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 27, at 769-70.
133
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treatment qualify as constitutionally cognizable, it makes sense to give special
attention to "fundamental interests" rooted, albeit outside the Equal Protection
Clause, within the Constitution itself.
By way of example, in Griffin v. Illinois the Court held that states that
make criminal appeals available to convicted defendants may not deny access
to appellate review based on a convicted defendant's indigency.1 4 0 The source
of the right laid down in Griffin is not the Due Process Clause because "a State
is not required . . to provide . . a right to appellate review at all" under due
process principles.141 Nor does the right spring from any status-based antidiscrimination principle because the Court has long held that laws that disadvantage the poor in practical effect (in contrast, for example, to laws that purposefully discriminate on the basis of race) do not, as a rule, present equal protection problems.1 42 So where did this constitutional rule of Griffin come from?
According to the Court itself, Griffin and its progeny "reflect both equal protection and due process concerns."143
And why not? Access to a direct criminal appeals-even if not mandated
by any single clause of the Constitution when viewed in isolation-is a matter
of profound real-world importance to convicted defendants in those states that
choose to permit such appeals. It is one thing if, for example, a state requires
that all persons, including cash-strapped citizens, pay the same fixed fee when
they visit a public campground. It is a very different thing, however, if a state
denies indigent individuals sentenced to go prison any and all appeal rights. So
it is because in the latter case the idea of "due process of law" enters the scene.
Indeed, it does so with a special measure of constitutional force because the
core purpose of pursuing criminal appeals often is to vindicate the very protections afforded to criminal defendants by the textual commands ofthe Constitution itself. 144
At the heart of the American legal system lies the idea of "Equal Justice
Under Law"-a principle that is not easily reconciled with affording appellate
review of serious criminal convictions only to those who can afford to pay a

140

351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).

141

Id.

142 See, e.g., Ortweinv. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656,660 (1973) (examining requirement of a filing fee
to appeal a denial of benefits under the rational-basis standard because "[n]o suspect classification,
such as race, nationality, or alienage, is present").
143 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (noting that inthis setting "[d]ue process and equal
protection principles converge" (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983))).
144 See Grffin, 351 U.S. at 19 ("Thus to deny adequate review to the poor means that many of
them may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions which appellate courts
would set aside."). Notably, those protections are made operative against the states primarily by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly insofar as it incorporates Bill of
Rights protections, which likewise are located in the whole document that is the Constitution.
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fee.1 4 5 To be sure, the phrase "Equal Justice Under Law" does not appear within the four corners of the Constitution. But the idea comes into plain view
when the Equal Protection Clause is read with attentiveness to the Due Process
Clauses and their commitment to procedural justice. To repeat: The Due Process Clauses, by themselves, might well not require the state to afford defendants a criminal appeal.1 46 But those clauses help to show that, when the government does afford a process so tied to ensuring basic legality as the chance to
pursue the overturning of a serious criminal punishment attributable to reversible trial-court errors, the requirement of "equal protection" dictates that this
opportunity be made available to the rich and the poor alike.
First impressions might suggest thatthe style of equal protection analysis
set forth in Griffin-with its focus on equal procedural justice-has little, if
anything, to do with the claim of substantive liberty vindicated in Obergefell.
But first impressions can be deceiving. To begin with, just as was the case in
Griffin, the marriage-limiting law at issue in Obergefell did not apply to a
group of individuals (there, gays and lesbians) previously identified as belonging to a suspect class. 147 Nor did the Court in Obergefell declare that, from that
day forward, gays and lesbians would constitute a protected or quasi-protected
group for equal protection purposes. Instead, the Court chose to interpret the
guarantee of "equal protection" by focusing on the special importance of the
marital relationship-a matter that was salient not only because of the deeply
rooted social significance of the marital institution, but also because of its constitutional status, as established in the Court's prior substantive due process
cases.148
In sum, as in Griffin, the Court in Obergefell took account of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause-albeit, here, in its substantive dimension-in the process of giving meaning to the opaque textual safeguard of
"equal protection." No less important, in both Griffin and Obergefell,just as in
Smith, the Court proceeded, as a functional matter, in exactly the same way it
had proceeded in Speiser and Roaden: In interpreting an ambiguous rightscreating provision (here, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause),
it relied in part on another clause (here, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause) located within the same whole document that is the Constitution
of the United States.
145 Indeed, the phrase "Equal Justice Under Law" appears on the fagade of the
Supreme Court
Building itself.
146 See supra note 141 and accompanying
text.

147

See RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND

PROCEDURE § 18.28(c)(ii) (5th ed. 2012 & 2020 Supp.).
148 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (relying on "the fundamental right to
marry" recognized in earlier substantive due process rulings).
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III. THE COMMONALITY OF HYBRID RIGHTS: OF VOTING, INCORPORATION,
REVERSE INCORPORATION AND MORE

'

Parts I and II discuss cases in which the Supreme Court's vindication of
hybrid rights was easy to recognize. In each such case, the Court dealt with
only two provisions of the Constitution that opinion-readers could readily see
as operating in tandem, however controversial those provisions'joint operation
might be. As it turns out, there exist many more hybrid-rights rulings, and
some of those rulings involve more complicated instances of hybrid-rights
analysis. These additional cases-especially those involving incorporation,
reverse incorporation, and equal-protection-based voting rights-merit especially close attention, in part because, just like Speiserand Roaden, they constitute long-settled features of the constitutional landscape.1 49 Moreover, careful inspection reveals that, again just like with Speiser and Roaden, the Court's
use of the hybrid-rights methodology in these cases differed not at all, as a
matter of substance, from its use of that methodology in Smith and Obergefell.
Some cases that involve hybrid-rights analysis present a special complication because, in interpreting a disputed constitutional provision, the Court
looks at not just one other clause set forth in the Constitution, but at multiple
other texts that the Constitution includes. The Court's many voting-related
equal protection rulings exemplify this approach. In Harperv Virginia Board
of Elections, for example, the Court held that state poll taxes violate the Equal
Protection Clause on the ground that these exactions discriminate against the
poor with regard to the "fundamental political right" to vote. 50 But where did
this "fundamental political right" come from? More specifically, how could the
Justices find it to exist when "the right to vote in state elections is nowhere
expressly mentioned" in the constitutional text?1 5
The best answer is that the special status of voting springs from a variety
of constitutional provisions, all of them connected to the centrality of republicanism in the American system of government. 52 Particularly important in this

149

See infra notes 150-173 and accompanying text.

150 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
151

Id. at 665.
Particularly illuminating in this regard is the heavy reliance placed by the majority in Harper
on its earlier and seminal one-person-one-vote reapportionment ruling, founded on the Equal Protection Clause, inReynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). There, the Court pointed directly to the
"Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth Amendments" in emphasizing
that "history has seen a continuing expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country,"
while also observing that "restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government,"
which obviously finds its legal basis in the many election-centered provisions of both the original
Constitution and its amendments. Id. at 555 & n.28. In addition, the Court inReynolds squarely drew
on its earlier ruling in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), which had deemed the one-person-onevote principle applicable to statewide gubernatorial races in part by relying on the American "concep152
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regard is the Republican Form of Government Clause. 153 But also in the picture is the presupposition that popular elections will lead to the selection of
members of lower state legislative chambers and, consequently, members of
the House of Representatives.15 4 Of similar salience are recurring references to
"Electors," "Election," and "Elections" throughout Article 1.155 And especially
telling is the striking reality that no fewer than six of the sixteen still-operative
post-Bill of Rights amendments focus specifically on blocking state interference with the right to vote.156
In short, in Harperand its progeny, the Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause-just as it did in both Griffin and Obergefell-by looking at the
Constitution as a whole. The only difference was that the Court in Griffin and
Obergefell focused on just one companion clause in fleshing out the meaning
of the term "equal protection," while in the line of authority launched by Harper, the Court found interpretive guidance in more than one provision. For our
purposes, however, this difference involves nothing more than an inconsequential detail. The overarching point is that the voting rights cases, no less than the
cases discussed earlier in this Article, involved consultation of material lodged
elsewhere in the whole constitutional document as the Court interpreted a single, ambiguous, and controlling constitutional text. Nor is the Harperline of
cases unique. In other contexts, too, the Court has pointed to multiple provisions of the whole text in the process of discerning the scope of a hard-topenetrate constitutional provision. 57
tion of political equality" supported in no small measure by "the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments." Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558 (quoting Gray, 372 U.S. at 381).
153 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government .... ").
154 Id. art. I, § 2.
155
Id. § § 2-5.
156 Id amend. XIV, § 2 (penalizing states with reduced representation when
they disenfranchise
males at least twenty-one years old); id. amend. XV, § 1 (barring discrimination in state voting rules
based on "race, color, or previous condition of servitude"); id. amend. XVII (providing for popular
election of United States Senators); id amend. XIX (barringvote-related discrimination "on account
of sex"); id amend. XXIV (outlawing poll taxes for federal elections); id. amend. XXVI (outlawing
denial of voting rights to citizens "who are eighteenyears of age or older"); see also Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 567 n.2 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Constitution uses the words
'right to vote' in five separate places: the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments."). Additional work in expanding the franchise was done by the TwentyThird Amendment, whichprovided for participationby residents of the District of Columbia inpresidential elections. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
157 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 804-05 (1995) (considering jointly (1)
Article I, Section 5, Clause 1, (2) Article I, Section 6, (3) Article I, Section 4, Clause 4, and (4) Article
II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution in concluding that the right to elect "representatives to the
National Legislature was a new right" and thus not reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment);
Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967) ("It is significant that the guarantee of freedom of
speech and press falls between the religious guarantees and the guarantee of the right to petition for

20201]

Reconceptualizing HybridRights

23 87

Another form of rights hybridization-one that initially might seem to
have nothing to do with Smith and Obergefell-involves incorporation. In
seminal rulings handed down not long after adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court made it clear that the Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause did not subject the states to the many safeguards directed
against federal invasion by the Bill of Rights.1 58 In later cases, however, the
Court saw fit to apply to questions of incorporation the same fundamentalfairness test that it deemed operative in evaluating other claims brought forward by litigants under the banner of the Due Process Clause.1 59 In the incorporation cases, however, the fundamental-fairness test developed a distinctly
text-tied, hybrid-rights quality.
The organizing idea found expression in Duncan v. Louisiana, where the
Court held that states must afford to criminal defendants the same jury-trial
right that the Sixth Amendment made operative in federal prosecutions.1 60 As
the Court put the critical point in that case: "The Fourteenth Amendment denies the States the power to 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.' In resolving conflicting claims concerning the
meaning of this spacious language, the Court has looked increasingly to the
Bill of Rights for guidance .... "161
The result of rulings such as Duncan is that a special sub-rule regarding
application ofthe fundamental-fairness principle rooted in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment now operates in incorporation cases.1 62 This rule dictates
that states presumptively violate the guarantee of "due process of law" whenever they fail to afford the text-based protections directed against the federal
government by the Bill of Rights. Put another way, the Court in the incorporation cases-just like in other hybrid-rights cases-has looked to the whole
document in construing a highly ambiguous term. More specifically, it has relied heavily on terms lodged outside the Fourteenth Amendment in defining
redress of grievances in the text of the First Amendment, the principles of which are carried to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment. It partakes of the nature ofboth, for it is as much a guarantee to
individuals of their personal right to make their thoughts public and put them before the community,
as it is a social necessity required for the 'maintenance of our political system and an open society.'
(citation omitted) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967))).
15
1 See, e.g., Twiningv. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 94-96 (1908) (relying onthe Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)).
159 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. See generallyBambauer & Massaro, supra note
16, at 310-11 ("Within the category of fundamental rights are two sub-types of rights: those derived
from enumerated rights set forth in the Bill of Rights . . and 'unenumerated' rights deemed to be
fundamental to ordered liberty.").
160 391 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1968).
161 Id. at 147-48 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1).
162 See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text (discussing the fundamental fairness princi-

ple).
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what rights qualify as "fundamental" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
Indeed, the Court's cross-clause method of dealing with a single text's ambiguity in the incorporation cases has been particularly transparent because the
Court in this context, as illustrated by Duncan, often states explicitly that it is
looking to separate constitutional provisions in deciphering the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's case-dispositive, but ambiguous, terminology.1 63 The
only special characteristics of the incorporation rulings are that: (1) there a lot
of them, and (2) each one follows the same interpretive pattern because of the
common character, including with regard to textual location, of the Constitution's Bill of Rights provisions.
These two distinct features of the incorporation decisions, however, do
not alter their essential commonality with Speiser, Roaden, Smith, and Obergefell. To be sure, there are many incorporation decisions, and in each one the
Court assimilated into the Due Process Clause an elsewhere-located textual
protection of rights in "jotfor jot" fashion.1 64 But so what? The relevant point
is that, in each ofthe incorporation cases, the Court looked to other features of
the whole constitutional instrument in addressing an ambiguity-here, an ambiguity built into the Fourteenth Amendment's "due process of law" linguistic
command, which the Court has interpreted to protect "fundamental" rights.
In sum, the incorporation cases fit hand-in-glove with the overarching
text-based account of hybrid rights developed in this paper. To repeat: In each
case in which the Court incorporated a Bill of Rights protection into the Fourteenth Amendment, it drew upon one text (namely, a particular clause of the
Bill of Rights) to help resolve an ambiguity presented by the case-controlling
text (namely, the Fourteenth Amendment's safeguard of "due process of law").
And the whole-document-based ambiguity-addressing interpretive method put
to use in the incorporation context in this way is the same interpretive method
that underlies each of the Court's other-and oftentimes much more harshly
maligned-hybrid-rights precedents.
A final, less-than-obvious form ofhybrid-rights decision making involves
reverse incorporation. As the preceding discussion reveals, the Court in its
many incorporation rulings drew upon the text of the Bill of Rights to help resolve a nettlesome ambiguity that lurks in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Notably, the reverse-incorporation cases concern essentially
the same problem-that is, how to deal with an ambiguity embedded in the
term "due process of law," albeit as thatterm is used in the Fifth Amendment.
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
On the subject of "jot for jot" incorporation, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.3.3, at 531-32 (5th ed. 2015) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (noting that the Supreme Court's approach has been to incorporate rights in such a
way that they "apply to the states exactly as they apply to the federal government").
163
164
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This problem has arisen because the Constitution includes no freestanding
Equal Protection Clause that operates against the federal government.1 65 Accordingly, the Court has had to consider the extent to which it should look for
guidance, in interpreting the Fifth Amendment's deeply ambiguous text-based
command of "due process" (as fleshed out by the fundamental-fairness standard), by consulting Equal Protection Clause-based protections made applicable, though only against the states, by the Fourteenth Amendment.1 66 And in a
series of highly consequential rulings, the Court has determined that all (or at
least essentially all) of these text-based protections do apply to the federal
government by way of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.167
Many commentators claim that the Court's reverse-incorporation jurisprudence has made mincemeat of the constitutional text.1 68 Perhaps they are
right, but that line of critique has no bearing on the key point made here. The
point is that, at bottom, the Court's recognition of hybrid rights in the reverseincorporation cases has operated in exactly the same way as its recognition of
hybrid rights in all the other authorities this Article has examined. As a practical matter, the Court has had to determine the extent to which the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, by way of its demand for fundamental fairness, guards against race discrimination and other forms of unequal treatment.
And in the end, the Court has made this determination by looking at the whole
constitutional document, which includes the Equal Protection Clause.
Put simply, the Court's reverse-incorporation jurisprudence is all about
the recognition of a "hybrid right." Indeed, the reverse-incorporation principle
involves a particularly straightforward, rather than complex, form ofhybridization. This is so because-just like Speiser, Roaden, Smith, and Obergefell-the
reverse-incorporation cases involve interpreting only one contested constitutional text (here, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause) in light of only
one other constitutional text (here, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause). Indeed, the only thing that stands out about the Court's reverseincorporation jurisprudence is that-much like the Court's incorporation jurisSee, e.g., Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 16, at 317 (noting this point).
See id. at 318 (explaining that, when it comes to the federal government, "[i]nequality thus is a
due process liberty problem, as a matter of current constitutional grammar").
16 7
Id. at 317 (adding that the Court's extension of protections rooted in equality made applicable
to the federal governmentby way of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause stem from "its dynamic relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment."); see, e.g., Weinbergerv. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
638 n.2 (1975) (describing the "Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims" as
"precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment").
168
See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, BollingAlone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 977 n.7 (2004) (noting
that reverse incorporation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rules into the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause clashes with the separate textual protection of equal protection rights and due
process rights in the Fourteenth Amendment).
165
166
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prudence-it has an exceptionally far-reaching practical impact. That fact,
however, does not alter the single-clause-interpreted-in-light-of-the-wholedocument-based, hybrid-rights character ofthe reverse-incorporation principle.
But wait! Some observers might claim that the Court's work with incorporation and reverse incorporation is different from, and less textually ambitious than, its more-often-criticized fiddling with multiple clauses in cases such
as Smith and Obergefell.169 This claim has its origin in two propositions: (1)
that "incorporation by reference" is commonplace in legal documents; 170 and
(2) that, as a practical matter, the incorporation and reverse-incorporation doctrines involve-as their very names suggest-nothing more than this sort of
"incorporation." As a result, so the argument goes, the incorporation and reverse-incorporation rulings are very much unlike Smith and Obergefellindeed, very much unlike Speiser and Roaden, too-because that quartet of
cases did not involve any interpretive work remotely akin to incorporation by
reference. Instead, each of those four cases involved what might be called
cross-clause illumination, and that-so the argument continues-is very different from cross-clause incorporation.
There is, however, a fatal flaw in this effort to fence off the Court's incorporation and reverse-incorporation rulings from these other hybrid-rights precedents: It simply is not true that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause incorporates by reference the Bill of Rights or that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates by reference the protections of the
Equal Protection Clause. After all, neither of the Due Process Clauses makes
any reference whatsoever to any other constitutional provisions. Any effort to
single out the incorporation and reverse-incorporation cases as textually distinct instances of incorporation by reference thus stumbles right out of the
starting blocks.' 7
To be sure, in cases such as Duncan, the Court made use of wholedocument interpretive canon in a way that differs from how the Court utilized
See supra notes 25-29, 112 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Incorporationby Reference, BLACK' SLAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining
the term as referring to "making a secondary document part of a primary document by including in the
primary document a statement that the secondary document should be treated as if it were contained
within the primary one").
171 To be sure, if the text of the Due Process Clauses did incorporate by reference protections set
forth elsewhere in the document, that might place these cases in a very different category. Notably,
some analysts have viewed the text of the Fourteenth Amendment as in effect incorporatingby reference all Bill of Rights protections by way of its use of the term "privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States." See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that "the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause"). The Due Process
Clauses, however, are not the same thing as the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and the Court has
approached their operation in a very different way.
169
171
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this same canon in cases such as Roaden. Thus, in Duncan-type cases the
Court has incorporated rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the
Amendment does not incorporate those rights by reference. In contrast, in
Roaden-type cases, the Court did not incorporate into one open-ended provision a spelled-out list of protections established by companion texts. But so
what? Nothing in the whole-document canon of interpretation suggests its only
proper use lies in resolving textual ambiguities by way of cross-clause rightsincorporation, as opposed to cross-clause illumination. Indeed, across the full
range of cases in which courts have looked to the whole-document canon of
interpretation, the Court has not often used it to "incorporate" into a general
textual command a mixed bag of specific rights established elsewhere in a
document. This manner of relying on companion provisions in actuality is rare,
rather than the interpretive norm.
In sum, all the cases discussed in Parts I, II, and III involve the same interpretive method. In Roaden, the Court interpreted the ambiguous terms ofthe
Fourth Amendment in light of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
In the reverse-incorporation cases, the Court interpreted the ambiguous terms
of the Fifth Amendment in light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And in all the cases discussed in between-from Speiser to
Smith to Obergefellto Harperto Duncan-the Court wielded exactly the same
look-at-the-whole-instrument canon of interpretation.
What is more, the extended list of hybrid-rights decisions canvassed in the
preceding pages is itself far from complete. Other commentators have suggested
that hybrid-rights rulings have "arisen with surprising frequency across different
doctrinal domains."17 2 A more accurate description is that cases of this kind are
legion.1 73 Moreover, many of these cases-such as the incorporation and reM. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1074; see also Abrams & Garrett, supra note 16, at 1316 (describing these cases as "surprisingly common"); Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts ofDiscrimination,
102 VA. L. REV. 895, 950 (2016) (asserting that such "intermingling of the clauses . . is increasingly
common").
173 There are, for example, dozens of cases that have built on the principles of Harperand Griffin
to provide equal treatment to persons inboth the voting context and criminal law (and criminal-lawlike) settings, as well as large numbers of other cases that apply the Equal Protection Clause with an
eye to fundamental-rights principles rooted in substantive due process. The Court's use of the hybridrights methodology, however, hardly stops there. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665
(1983) (relying on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to limit state powerto revoke probation based on a parolee's inability to pay his fine and restitution); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980) (plurality opinion) (noting the right of access to criminal trials protected by First Amendment guarantees of speech press together with the right of assembly); Hampton
v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (invalidating a wholesale ban on legal-alien service in
the federal civil service based not only on equal protection principles, but also proper-lawmaker procedural due process concerns); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-68 (1969) (relying onbothFirst
Amendment free-expression principles and Fourteenth Amendment right-to-privacy principles to
invalidate state laws to the extent they proscribed the possession of obscene materials in one's home);
172
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verse-incorporation cases-long have stood as key pillars of constitutional law,
relied on for decades in thousands ofjudicial rulings. Previous accounts of hybrid rights, however, have failed to focus on the underlying kinship that exists
between the Court's many incorporation and reverse-incorporation rulings and
cases such as Smith and Obergefell. Yet, recognizing this kinship drives home a
point of central importance: It helps to show how hybrid rights have played both
a central and widely accepted role-rather than only a peripheral and tenuous
one-in the Supreme Court's decision making over many years.
IV. RESPONDING TO CRITIQUES OF HYBRID RIGHTS

So, has the Supreme Court's recurring use of the hybrid-rights methodology taken it, time and time again, in a wrong direction? This Part considers
that question.I' 4 Section A responds to concerns that judicial vindication of
these rights is non-originalist.1 75 Section B addresses the criticism that this approach to rights recognition is unduly activist.1 76 Section C takes on the claim
that the hybrid-rights methodology is unmanageable.1 77 Section D considers

&

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622, 630 (1886) (invalidating a statute that created a rebuttable
presumption that wrongdoing had occurred characterized as involving a "confession" based on a
defendant's refusal to turn over papers concerning that conduct, and reasoning that in such a case "the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment run almost into each other" even though the effectively "compulsory
production" of documents lacked "certain aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure"); see
also Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561, 2563 (2018) (per curiam) ("When an officer's order to stop
praying is alleged to have occurred during the course of investigative conduct that implicates Fourth
Amendment rights, the First and Fourth Amendment issues may be inextricable."); Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (describing the Court's earlier ruling in Lawrence v. Texas as
one inwhichthe Court "drew upon principles of liberty and equality" (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578 (2003))); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744,774-75 (2013) (relying on interaction
of substantive due process and equal protection protections, coupled with federalism values, to invalidate federal law that differentiated between same-sex and opposite-sex married couples); Abrams
Garrett, supra note 16, at 1314-15, 1347 (asserting that the Court's Mirandaruling was "informed by
multiple constitutional sources," particularly the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause and the
Sixth Amendment's protection of the right to counsel). A particularly expansive set of cases that involve a type of hybrid rights addresses how "the processesby which laws are enacted affect their
validity under seemingly substantive constitutional provisions like the First Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause." Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, StructuralDue Process, andSemisubstan-

tive ConstitutionalReview, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (2002); see also Dan T. Coenen A Constitution ofCollaboration:ProtectingFundamentalValues with Second-LookRules oflnterbranchDialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1860 n.1143 (2001) (collecting numerous semisubstantivereview
17 4 cases and noting their linkage to the Court's hybrid-rights jurisprudence).
See infra Part IV.A-D.
175 See infra Part IV.A.
176 See infra Part IV.B.
177 See infra Part IV.C.
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and rejects the contention that judicial recognition of hybrid rights is countertextual.178
A. Criticism One: HybridRights Are Non-Originalist
Many originalists take a dim view of rights derived from the "penumbras"
or "structures" of the Constitution.' 7 9 Yet, that is precisely where existing theories of hybrid rights tend to locate them.1 80 As we have seen, however, these
theories miss the mark because, on the better view, every previously recognized hybrid right is best understood as having its origin in a discrete clause of
the Constitution. It thus would seem that originalists should be no more inclined to discard hybrid rights than they are ready to discard any other rights
that derive from a particular constitutional provision.181
Or should they? Some originalists might say that relevant ratifying communities would never have expected the sort of cross-clause interpretive approach undertaken in cases such as Speiser and Roaden. Each clause, they
might say, must rest entirely on its own bottom, including because the Framers
took care to lodge constitutional commands in separately enumerated articles
and sections. These analysts might see it as especially dubious to discover hybrid rights in the Constitution's amendments. After all, both the Bill of Rights
itself and each of its successor amendments came into the Constitution through
highly individualized decision-making processes that occurred in an uncoordinated fashion at points in time removed from one another.
178

See infra Part IV.D.

See, e.g., Colby, Originalism andStructuralArgument,supra note 24, at 1317 ("A method of
constitutional argument that does not seek to determine and apply the original meaning of the text of a
particular constitutional provision is not a form of public meaning originalism as that theory is generally understood."); see also Solum, Originalismand the Unwritten Constitution, supra note 27, at
1967 (noting that "[s]ome originalists may believe that the spirit of originalism is fundamentally inconsistent with the notion of freestanding extratextual fundamental law"). To be sure, there are crosscurrents in the law on this score. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. But even those originalists who are open to endorsing structural or penumbral reasoning in support of non-textual federalism
and separation-of-powers rules may be far less enthusiastic about using that methodology in the service of identifying individual rights. See Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1344-45 (noting this distinction).
18 See supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
18 See Colby, Originalism and StructuralArgument,supra note 24, at 1324 (contrasting "principles that are allegedly implicit in the constitutional design as a whole," and thus problematically untethered to a particular text, with constructions even if informed by constitutional themes and surrounding texts-that "give effect to particular ambiguous constitutional provisions"); see also id at
1317 (citing the work of Professors Lawrence Solum, Kurt Lash, and Michael Ramsey as tying
originalism to deciphering "the original meaning of a constitutionalprovision," but noting that this
process permits courts to use "'the constitution in all its parts' to illuminate the meaning of a particularpart" (first quoting Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism,103 NW.
U. L. REv. 923, 926 (2009); then quoting Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland andHistorical
Textualism, 73 Mo. L. REV. 969, 972 (2008) (quoting BLACK, supra note 23, at 7)).
179
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This critique, however, ignores the key point that there exists a wellsettled norm of addressing textual ambiguities that lurk in any legal document
by considering the document as a whole.18 2 Indeed, because this norm reaches
back centuries, it seems entirely wrong from an originalist perspective to ignore companion provisions in dealing with ambiguities that particular provisions of the Constitution present.1 83 In particular, if lawyers, legislators, or
even "intelligent and informed people of the time" 8 4 made up the core of relevant ratifying communities, those citizens surely would have known of the interpretive practice of reading legal documents as a whole. 85 In addition, even
ordinary-citizen members of those communities would have grasped this general idea based on common practice. Who wouldn't, for example, look at surrounding textual passages to help discern the meaning of an obscure phrase in
a letter or newspaper column? Put simply, it comports with historical understanding to deal with ambiguous constitutional texts by looking at companion
provisions in the same document.1 86
An important line of originalist thought supports this same conclusion.
According to theorists such as Professor Lawrence Solum, there oftentimes
comes a point beyond which it is impossible to discern the operative original

8

See Jarrod Shobe, EnactedLegislative FindingsandPurposes, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 669, 674-

75 (2019) (collecting authorities); infra note 240 and accompanying text (collecting Supreme Court

authorities where Justices cross-referenced constitutional provisions in the interpretive process, including provisions put in place at different times).
18 See Colby, Originalism and StructuralArgument, supra note 24, at 1313 (suggesting that
"using the structure of the document to help determine the original meaning of otherwise vague or
ambiguous provisions of the constitutional text" reflects "the sort of holistic textual analysis that
ought not be concerning to originalists"); Solum, Originalismandthe Unwritten Constitution,supra
note 27, at 1964 (explaining that public-meaning originalism requires judges "to read individual
clauses in the context of the whole Constitution"); John O. McGinnis, OriginalismEncompassesText
and Structure, LAW & LIBERTY (Aug. 21, 2018), https://lawliberty.org/originalism-encompassestextual-and-structural-modalities-pamela-karhan/ [https://perma.cc/PYA7-W9HU] (endorsing, from
an originalist perspective, use of the whole-document canon in constitutional interpretation). The work
of Professors McGinnis and Rappaport, among others, supports (quite understandably) using ratification-era interpretive canons including the whole-text canon as part of the originalist methodology.
See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, OriginalInterpretive Principlesas the Core of
Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 372 (2007) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Original
InterpretivePrinciples](suggesting that originalists "should follow the principles of interpretationthat
a reasonable person at the time of the framing and ratification thought would be applied to the Constitution").
184 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38

(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
18 See McGinnis & Rappaport, OriginalInterpretivePrinciples,supra note 183, at 374-75 (arguing that "the enactors would have believed that [ambiguous provisions'] future application would
be based upon the interpretive rules accepted at the time").
186 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 183 ("There is nothing about originalism in general that suggests that terms should be read in isolation from others and original methods confirms [sic] that they
were not so interpreted.").
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meaning of intrinsically vague constitutional terms.1 87 When courts confront
this situation, they accordingly must go to work in the "construction zone,"
building on general principles and pragmatic considerations to determine the
proper application of contested passages.1 88 If one embraces this refinement of
the originalist approach, it seems especially defensible for courts to look at
surrounding text as one source of guidance in giving meaning to constitutional
provisions. To take one example, in determining when equal protection has
been denied, why should courts not look at background principles, grounded in
a variety of clauses that presuppose the centrality of voting within our republican system? Is it not fair to say that those clauses help establish the meaning of
equality by signaling that broad-based participatory republicanism lies at the
heart of the constitutional plan?' 89
The work ofwell-credentialed originalists further evidences why wholetext-based hybridism coheres with the originalist philosophy. For example, it
was Justice Scalia, "original meaning textualism's patron saint," who in Smith
identified the "hybrid situation" free-exercise/due process right seen as properly undergirding the Court's protection of the religion-practicing parents in
Yoder.' 90 Nor did Justice Scalia's hybrid-rights work in Smith stand alone. He
also openly endorsed First Amendment due process rights,191 and joined in
making use of specialized voting-rights principles rooted in the Equal Protection Clause as informed by other clauses.1 92
See generallyLawrence B. Solum, Originalismand ConstitutionalConstruction, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 453 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Originaland ConstitutionalConstruction].
188 See id. at 458 (observing that "the actual text of the U.S. Constitution contains
general, ab18?

stract, and vague provisions that require constitutional construction for their application to concrete
constitutional cases"); id. at 472 (adding that "construction is essentially driven by normative concerns"); id. at 523 (asserting that "[c]onstitutional construction is ubiquitous in constitutional practice"); id at 530 (noting that this is so because "discernable original meaning underdetermines some
constitutional questions"); see also Colby, OriginalismandStructuralArgument, supra note 24, at
1322 (noting the need to move into "the construction zone" when "multiple possible rules of decision
. . are each consistent with the vague, open-ended, or ambiguous original meaning" (quoting id. at
458)).
189 See, e.g., AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 183-87.
190 Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The InterpretiveForce ofthe Constitution's
Secret
DraftingHistory, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1139 (2003).
191 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I do not doubt
that the
First Amendment contains within it some procedural prescriptions .... ").
192 See Bushv. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (applying specialized equal protection principles
applicable invoting cases). Indeed, one might fairly say that Justice Scalia's originalist interpretations
of the constitutional provisions in all instances including in identifying protected (and unprotected)
rights stem from the decision to resolve constitutional ambiguities in light of whole-document-based
interpretation. So, it is because a core feature of his overarching originalist approach to interpretation
is rooted in lessons gleaned from the constitutional document taken as a whole. More specifically,
Justice Scalia expressed the view that courts must reject an "aspirational" reading of each of the document's most opaque provisions because (1) judges must read each of those provisions in context; (2)
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Justice Hugo Black, perhaps the most celebrated of all Supreme Court
textualists,1 93 likewise supported the First Amendment due process methodology. Indeed, he did so from the very outset by endorsing the majority's position
in Speiser.194 No less important, it was Justice Black who authored the lead
opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, thus launching the entire hybrid-rights jurisprudence that affords indigent persons equal access to criminal appeals and kindred forms of judicial redress.1 95
Well-credentialed academic originalists also have shown enthusiasm for
reading rights-creating constitutional provisions in light of companion texts. In
an article published shortly after the Court handed down Obergefell, for example, Steven Calabresi and Hannah Begley advanced "an originalist argument
for the right to same-sex marriage."1 96 A key step in the development of that
argument involved asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause broadly outlaws sex-based discrimination.1 97 For some originalists, this
claim might seem farfetched, given the pervasiveness of sex discrimination at
the time of the Amendment's ratification in 1868.198 Calabresi and Begley
found their way past this difficulty, however, by insisting that the Fourteenth
Amendment must be read "through the lens of the Nineteenth Amendment,"
which drew women into the political community by affording them the right to
vote.1 99 In other words, once "the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920,
any logical synthesis ofthese two Amendments required that laws that discrimthe whole constitutional document provides a key part of the context in which to read those provisions; and (3) in that regard, "[t]he context suggests that the abstract and general terms, like the concrete and particular ones, are meant to nail down current rights, rather than aspire after future ones."
SCALIA, supra note 184, at 135.
193 Michael C. Dorf, InterpretiveHolism and the StructuralMethod, orHow CharlesBlack Might
Have ThoughtAbout Campaign FinanceReform andCongressionalTimidity, 92 GEO. L.J. 833, 842

(2004) (asserting that "[t]he most celebrated textualist Supreme Court Justice is not Antonin Scalia or
Clarence Thomas, but Hugo Black"); Michael J. Gerhardt,A Tale ofTwo-Textualists: A CriticalComparison ofJusticesBlack andScalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 28-37 (1994) (showing how Justices Black
and Scalia shared similar interpretive ideologies).
194 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
195 See 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In a similar fashion, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist
voiced profound
concerns about constitutional interpretation that strayed from original meaning. Rehnquist, supra note
60, at 706. But he signed on, with no expression of consternation, to decisions such asRoaden v. Kentucky and Employment Division v. Smith.
196 Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalismand Same-SexMarriage,70 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 648, 649 (2016).
197
Id. at 699.
198 E.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE

WRONG FOR AMERICA 66 (2005) (noting that, among ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, "[d]iscrimination on the basis of sex was generally thought to be reasonable").
199 Calabresi & Begley, supra note 196, at 648. For a more thorough development of this point,
see Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism andSex Discrimination,90 TEX. L. REV. 1,
66-96 (2011).
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inate on the basis of sex be seen as generally forbidden" by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 200

Much can be said about the case for gay-marriage rights made by Calabresi and Begley. 201 But one thing is crystal clear. In support oftheir originalist
argument, the authors made an unabashedly ambiguity-resolving, hybrid-rights
move. In their view, the Fourteenth Amendment did not bar state-based sexdiscrimination prior to 1920. Thereafter, however, the Equal Protection Clause
had to be read in light ofthe Nineteenth Amendment. One constitutional provision thus helped to clarify the reach of another-as has been the case in all the
hybrid-rights rulings discussed in Parts I, II, and III of this Article. 2 02
The bottom line is this: Properly understood, hybrid rights stem from applying the whole-document canon of interpretation, which itself has deep originalist roots, to a single and ambiguous text. What is more, leading originalists
have endorsed the recognition of hybrid rights, thus providing telling evidence
that the hybrid-rights methodology, whatever one might say about particular applications of it, falls as a general matter within the originalist tradition. 2 03
B. Criticism Two: Hybrid Rights Are Unduly Activist
Some observers assail the Supreme Court for overriding too freely and
too often choices made by the people's elected representatives. Because many
of these critics bemoan the Justices' invalidation of laws based on such opentextured constitutional provisions as the Equal Protection, Due Process, and
Free Speech Clauses, it is not surprising that they would find even more problematic the Court's weaving together of these and other constitutional texts on
its way to striking down legislation put in place by the popular branches of
government. 204 Obergefell is "Exhibit A" for their case. 205 There, after all, the
Court invalidated the duly enacted laws of thirty-one separate states. 2 06
Calabresi & Begley, supra note 196, at 699.
Orin Kerr, Is There an OriginalistCasefor a Right to Same-Sex Marriage?,WASH.
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspimcy/
wp/20 15/0 1/28/is-there-an-originalist-case -for-a-right-to -same-sex-marriage/ [https:///penna.cc/
2DYB-desv] (critiquing the Calabresi and Begley analysis, largely on problematic-level-of-generality
grounds).
202 See supra Parts I-III.
203 See supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
204 See, e.g., Zick, supra note 16, at 856 (pointing out the risk of "judicial activism" raised by
recognizing hybrid rights).
205 See Clare Huntington, Obergefell 's Conservatism:Reifying FamilialFronts, 84 FORDHAML.
REV. 23, 26 (2015) (noting the dissenters' charge of activism by the majority in Obergefell v. Hodg200

201 See, e.g.,

es).
206 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Brief of 57
Members of U.S. Congress asAmici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, id., 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos.
14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
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Justice Joseph Story captured the first difficulty with this challenge to hybrid rights in Martinv Hunter 's Lessee: "It is always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse,"
for wherever any power "may be vested, it is susceptible of abuse." 207 There is
a power ofjudicial review, and that power requires judges to enforce rights set
forth in the constitutional text. Hybrid rights, as we have seen, are set forth in
that text just as surely as other rights. Therefore, judges must enforce them.
Another difficulty with the judicial-activism critique is that it fails to recognize that the hybridization of rights sometimes operates as a tool ofjudicial
restraint. Consider Smith. 208 Prior to that decision, First Amendment doctrine
required courts to subject generally applicable laws to the strictest form of
scrutiny whenever those laws substantially burdened a challenger's free exercise of religion. 209 In Smith, however, the Court retreated from this activist
stance by reconceptualizing Yoder and related cases as establishing a much
narrower set of protections.210 The Court, in short, made use of the hybridrights methodology in the cause ofjudicial self-abnegation.
Obergefell illustrates much the same point. The challengers of the state
law in that case urged the Court to rule that state discrimination against gays
and lesbians always triggers an elevated standard of scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. 21' The Court, however, chose not to reach this far. Instead, it
decided the case on a narrower ground-that is, by holding that the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by preexisting substantive due process principles, justified judicial intervention in the specialized context of marriage. 212
The Court thus took a far less expansive view of equal protection rights than it
otherwise might have embraced. 213
In a rich and provocative body of work, Professor Cass Sunstein has led
the charge in trumpeting the advantages ofjudicial "minimalism" in constitu-

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344-45 (1816).
See generallyEmp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
209 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,718 (1981) ("The
state may justify an inroad on religious liberty [only] by showing that it is the least restrictive means
of achieving some compelling state interest.").
210 See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying
text.
21 Brief for Petitioners at 45, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556) (arguing that, because
"the broad medical and scientific consensus is that sexual orientation 'is . .. immutable,"' restrictions
based on this trait are properly subject to "heightened scrutiny" (quoting Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d
648, 657 (7th Cir. 2014))).
212 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598-99 (majority opinion).
213 See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 205, at 23 n.4 ("If the Court had seen discrimination
in marriage as part of a larger question about equal citizenship, all LGBT individuals would have benefitted.
A more robust LGBT rights agenda would include protection from discrimination in employment,
housing, and much more.").
207

208
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tional decision making.21 4 Minimalism eschews activism, and Obergefell had a
minimalist quality in the sense that the Court did not go nearly as far as it
might have gone in affording constitutional protections to gays and lesbians.
What is more, the Court's marriage-centered, half-a-loaf approach sprang from
its use of hybrid-rights reasoning. Put simply, the Court's capacity to recognize
hybrid rights sometimes permits it to issue rulings that are "narrow" and "shallow" as opposed to rulings that are "broad" and "deep." 15 And to the extent
that this is true, hybrid rights operate-in keeping with minimalist theory-to
rein in judicial adventurism, as opposed to letting it run free. 216
No less important, the effect of viewing one clause in light of another is
sometimes counter-activist in a direct and obvious way. In Grahamv Connor,
for example, a detainee made separate and alternative arguments that his arrest
violated both (1) objectively defined Fourth Amendment limits on unreasonable seizures, and (2) more subjectively defined substantive due process limits
on wrongful detention.217 The Court, however, rejected the latter claim by
holding that the detainee could not invoke the due-process-based safeguard
because only the more "explicit" Fourth Amendment protection should control
such a case. 2 18 The Court thus read the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clauses, as effectively informed by the Fourth Amendment's specialized treatment of searches and seizures, in a manner that negated any protections those Amendments otherwise might provide in the recurring context of
claimed improper arrests. 2 19
Graham reveals a key point about the purportedly counter-majoritarian
character ofthe whole-document-based, hybrid-rights methodology. And other
cases do so as well.2 2 0 This body of judicial work shows that, depending on

Eg.,

214

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME

COURT 61-63 (1999).
215 Id. at 16-19.
216 Accord, e.g., Karlan, supranote 5, at 477 (noting, for example, how "fundamental rights analysis
can provide a limiting principle for claims of equality"). Notably, this point may take on powerful "real
life" significance because of the recent replacement of Justice Kennedy by Justice Kavanaugh on the
Supreme Court bench. On this view, Justice Kennedy never missed a chance to strike down laws that
disadvantaged the LGBTQ community. But Justice Kennedy no longer sits on the Court, and the "narrow" nature of the precedent he crafted in Obergefellleaves room fora new majority coalition, potentially including Justice Kavanaugh, to decline to take the law farther down this rights-recognizing road.
Depending on one's point of view, that prospect may be good orbad. But one thing is certain: This state
of affairs highlights how the use of hybrid rights can restrain, and not just activate, judicial work that
involves overturning legislative judgments.
217 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989).
21
1 Id. at 395.
219 See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro,Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's "JotforJot"AccountofSub-

stantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1086, 1096-98 (1998) (highlighting this effect of Graham).
221 See, e.g., Albrightv. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273-75 (1994) (extending application of the Graham principle to bar plaintiff's substantive-due-process-based malicious-prosecution claim). Inter-
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context, viewing one constitutional provision in light of another can lead
courts to embrace a less activist, rather than a more activist, set of rightsdefining rules.22 ' In sum, when it comes to formulating hybrid rights, courts
stand at a door that can swing both ways.
Finally, the single-clause-based theory of hybrid rights developed in this
Article holds the potential to reduce the risks of judicial overreaching by
heightening the chances thatjudges will act transparently. Central to the promotion of rule-of-law values is the idea thatjudges should openly disclose the
reasoning process that supports their decisions.2 22 Courts, however, may balk
at freely disclosing lines of analysis that subject them to the dreaded charge of
judicial penumbralism. 223
Penumbral thinking, however, simply falls out of the picture when one
embraces the proper single-clause-viewed-in-light-of-the-whole-document approach to hybrid rights. This approach thus heightens the likelihood ofjudicial
transparency by inviting-indeed, requiring-courts to fit hybrid-rights decision making into a structured and familiar juridical framework. In addition to
enhancing transparency, the regularized use of this methodology should constrainjudicial activism by disciplining judicial work. Simply put, the danger of
runaway judging diminishes when governing doctrine requires courts to issue
rulings pursuant to a reason-guiding structure. And that is all the more true
when the operative reason-guiding structure displaces an alternative structure
that involves searching in shadows for penumbral "postulates that limit and
twined with these authorities is Nieves v. Bartlett,in which the plaintiff asserted a violation of his First
Amendment speech rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the theory that police officers arrested him in
retaliation for his speech. 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1720 (2019). The Court rejected this claim. Id. at 1728. It
reasoned that because the officers had probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to put the plaintiff
in custody based on his aggressive physical conduct, no speech-based-retaliation claim could be asserted even if the plaintiff's unwanted, but protected, First Amendment activity-motivated the action
of the officers. Id at 1727-28. In short, at least as a practical matter, the Court's treatment of the First
Amendment in light of the Fourth Amendment operated to defeat the plaintiff's otherwise-available
speech-retaliation claim. Id at 1723-25. In a similarvein, Professor Amar has argued that the primary
rights-restricting rule established in Smith to the effect that free-exercise challenges are unavailable
when one attacks a generally applicable law is itself supported by reading the First Amendment in
light of the Tenth Amendment. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 27, at 819; see also id at 815 (advocating a reading of the Free Speech Clause that limits protection for nonpolitical communication,
despite the clause's generalized textual reference to "speech," because the Speech and Debate Clause
of Article I, Section 6, provides an "analytic[al] link" that offers a "clue" that "[p]olitical speech is the
core idea").
221 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 27, at 787 ("[I]ntratextualismcan often be used onboth
sides of contested questions .... "); M. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1104-06 (discussing how courts
may use "[c]ombination analysis . .. to narrow the scope of a doctrinal holding").
2 22
See, e.g., Zick, supra note 16, at 855-56 ("[C]ourts and other interpreters must do a better job
of explaining how rights facilitate and illuminate one another. . . . Interpreters need to explain and
defend rights relationships with more depth and clarity." (footnote omitted)).
223 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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control."22 4 The single-clause-centered, whole-document framework for deciding hybrid-rights cases thus has a double appeal. It offers the prospect of both
heightening judicial transparency and constraining judicial excesses by disciplining the courts' decision-making work.22 5
C. Criticism Three: HybridRights Are Unmanageable
Critics of hybrid rights do not worry only about unbridled judicial activism. They also fear that the task of identifying this set of rights presents courts
with an impossible task-that is, a task that is simply too hard to undertake
given the inevitable difficulties of determining whether, when, and how to consult Constitutional Clause B in interpreting Constitutional Clause A. Accordingly, so the argument goes, courts should abandon the project altogether.
We have just seen, however, that the whole-text approach to hybrid rights
holds the potential of bringing to judicial decision making a form of analytical
discipline that alternative theories fail to supply. 226 We also have seen that the
224 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 332 (1934); see Solum, Originalismand
the Unwritten Constitution,supra note 27, at 1965 (indicating that structural orpenumbral reasoning

"prevents us from assigning meaning at the level of particularity required to do the work of constitutional practice," and advocating for a "focus" in constitutional decision making on individual clauses,
albeit with an openness to assessing "the interaction between clauses").
225 See Zick, supra note 16, at 853 (observing that "[w]hen rights intersect, it is imperative that
they not merge completely or lose their separate identities" and that "[t]extual and doctrinal boundaries can add a degree of clarity and precision to rights analysis"). Notably, there is a flipside to the
just-rebuffed argumentbased on risks of undue activism. Inparticular, there may well be defenders of
hybrid rights who will argue that only more open-ended approaches can give all constitutional protections their full due. Put differently, these analysts may worry that the text-specific approachto hybrid
rights advocated here will in some cases prove to be too constraining, thus hampering the ability of
judges to honor appropriately the complex and rich intersectionality of rights. Cf Denning & Reynolds, supra note 25, at 1091 (urging that "penumbral reasoning provides a corrective to the exceedingly narrow 'clause-bound' focus of past Supreme Courts"). Even if this concern has some merit, however, it poses no obstacle to viewing the whole-text approach as the proper way to handle the vast
majority of hybrid-rights cases. And it is telling on this score that the analysis offered here comports
with the results reached in all the Court's prior hybrid-rights rulings, including those rulings that have
struck analysts as the most controversial. In any event, advocates of the not-activist-enough position
should be careful what they wish for. Why? Because as we have seen, adherents of textualist and
originalist schools of interpretation are sure to look askance at penumbra-like theories of hybrid rights,
as will some (perhaps many) supporters of more accommodating interpretive traditions. Most important, a negative view of penumbral-rights reasoning, including with regard to recognizing hybrid
rights, is sure to turn off many, if not most, members of the current Supreme Court. See supra note 29
and accompanying text. In the end, I leave it to others to explore whether there might exist reasons to
recognize some truly-extraordinary-case "penumbral" supplement to the single-clause-focused approach to hybrid rights set forth in these pages. My current suspicion is that no such supplement is
needed. But even more important, those who advocate on behalf of hybrid rights should take care not
to let their conception of what is perfect become the enemy of what is good.
226 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 193, at 841 (highlighting that open-ended structuralism, despite
efforts made to defend it, "remains vulnerable to the charge of indeterminacy"). Put another way, a
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Supreme Court has recognized many hybrid rights in the past without generating
significant controversy, including in rulings that long have stood as centerpieces
of our nation's constitutional law.227 Even so, critics may remain unpersuaded.
How else might one answer their unmanageability-based line of attack?
One response takes the form of confession and avoidance. It may be that
assessing hybrid-rights claims-even within the structured framework put
forward here-often will require tricky exercises of interpretive judgment. But
what else is new? Constitutional law is loaded with doctrines that are difficult
to apply because that state of affairs is inevitable in a world laden with complexity. 228 The Court, for example, has recognized and applied a number of
federalism-related doctrines that are wholly non-textual in nature. 22 9 Some horizontal separation-of-powers principles likewise have their origins in "various
structural characteristics of the document" not tethered to any particular
clause. 230 The methodology of means-ends analysis pervades constitutional
law. Yet the questions this methodology presents-whether an interest is
"compelling," "important,"or only "legitimate," and whether a challenged law
is "rationally related," "substantially related," or "narrowly tailored" to gov-

shift away from a structural or penumbral view of hybrid rights to the single-text-based, wholedocument approach should neutralize concerns not only about judicial activism, see supra notes 223225 and accompanying text, but also manageability. See, e.g., Zick, supra note 16, at 850 (noting that
"separation [in the analysis of rights] can simplify analysis and facilitate doctrinal clarity").
227 See supra notes 172-173 and accompanying text (listing some of the many cases decided on
hybrid-rights theories).
22. See, e.g., Rochinv. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) ("In dealing not withthe machinery
of government but with human rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning,
is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of constitutional provisions.").
229 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (drawing on the Constitution's
"essential postulates"); see also Edward Cantu, The Roberts Court andPenumbral Federalism, 64
CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 271, 274 (2015) (exploring the "penumbral federalism" approach of the Roberts
Court); John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation,
122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2005 (2009) (referring to the Court's modem federalism rulings as recognizing "unenumerated states' rights").
20 Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1340, 1343 (observing that reasoning from "overall constitutional
structure" is "nothing radical" and "has been around for a long time"); see Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May CongressRemove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1582 (2000) ("It is a classic lawyer's trick and an especially easy trick to
play with separation-of-powers structural arguments to take a text, series of texts, or asserted relationship between texts, discern some 'principle' within it (formulated at a sufficiently high level of
generality), and then read that principle back into the Constitution .... "); Ernest A. Young, Aldenv.
Maine and the Jurisprudence ofStructure, 41 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1601, 1637 (2000) (assertingthat
"a sufficiently skillful structuralist can justify any result he pleases"). By way of example, Professor
Reynolds highlights the structural character of the law of standing. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1339.
As he puts it, the key aspect of standing under which a "federal court may exercise power 'only in the
last resort' and 'as a necessity' does not appear anywhere in my copy of Article III" and can be seen as
"rather dubious" considering the Article's actual phrasing. Id
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ernmental ends-border on the imponderable.23' No less important, judges
have no choice but to address these questions by relying on practical considerations, as to which the constitutional text itself gives no guidance whatsoever. 232 Why then should the Court, when it seeks to interpret an ambiguous
rights-granting provision, be blocked from seeking guidance from companion
texts that do appear in the Constitution?
A second point is that there is good reason to believe that courts can formulate workable principles to structure the application of the single-clause
theory of hybrid rights defended in this Article. Indeed, the Court's existing
hybrid-rights rulings may already support a synthesis that centers on the
recognition of process-related and equality-related protections, as opposed to
non-equality-based fundamental substantive rights. This subject is sufficiently
complex to require its own separate treatment. 233 But the key point for present
purposes is that developing decision-informing guideposts in this area of law is
far from a hopeless task. To be sure, applying these principles will not always
generate clear-cut answers in concrete cases. But in constitutional law, that is
par for the course. To recognize that applying hybrid-rights-law principles will
sometimes be difficult is not to establish the sort of intractable unmanageability that might, in rare instances, justify judicial abandonment of an entire field
of constitutional decision making. Rather, conscientious judges who encounter
hybrid-rights claims should do what they always do-that is, they should devise and refine overarching organizing principles in the process of resolving
case-specific disputes. 23 4
D. Criticism Four:Hybrid Rights Are Counter-Textual
The final argument against hybrid rights is that they are counter-textual.
From one vantage point, this argument is simple while, from another vantage
point, it is complex. On the simple view, hybrid rights fail to give proper

231 See generally CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 164, § 7.3.2, at 586-89
(discussing differing levels of means-ends scrutiny).
232 In interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, for example, the Court has signaled that
the pur-

suit of administrative inconvenience is neither a compelling nor a substantial state interest. See, e.g.,
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (holding the pursuit of administrative inconvenience interest
insufficient in applying intermediate scrutiny); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-36 (1969)
(concluding that the pursuit of administrative inconvenience was not compelling in applying strict
scrutiny). But that proposition has no grounding at all in the text of the Constitution.
2
. See generallyDan T. Coenen, Guiding Principles for Hybrid-Rights Decision-Making (working paper) (on file with author) (suggesting that the Court's past hybrid-rights rulings tend to align
with John Hart Ely's process-centered representation-reinforcement theory).
234
M. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1116 (concluding that "the complexity and unpredictability costs
that arise from the combination of clauses are not so great as to warrant a complete prohibition" and
"are better dealt with at the retail level").
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meaning to the constitutional text because they contort that text by weirdly
fusing together separate and freestanding clauses. 235 The analysis set forth in
this Article debunks this claim by showing that hybrid rights do not work this
way. Rather, their formulation involves three steps that courts take routinely in
the case-deciding process: (1) addressing an argument that a particular text has
a particular meaning, (2) determining that the thus-cited text is ambiguous on
that point, and (3) looking, in the process of addressing that ambiguity, for
guidance in companion provisions pursuant to the whole-document principle
of interpretation. This approach is not counter-textual in even the slightest degree. Indeed, its essential feature is to address problems of textual ambiguity
by consulting the text itself 236
The more elaborate text-based challenge goes something like this:
When a court extracts . . constitutional principles from a series of...
textual provisions it ignores "an important element of the lawmaker's
choice"-namely, the decision to embed within the text a series of
specific provisions, rather than a general statement of constitutional
purpose or principle. The generality level of each clause is itself the
product of pre-enactment bargains and compromises-bargains and
compromises that helped to secure the public support necessary to endow the document with legally binding effect. Combining these
clauses . . displaces the intended arrangement of bargains and compromises with alternative propositions that have not themselves been
codified.... [Thus, hybrid-rights] arguments warrant rejection . .
because they support unfaithful readings of the text.237
The sophisticated tenor of this argument may lend it a veneer of credence.
With regard to the particular theory of hybrid rights developed in this Article,
however, the argument fails for the simple reason that it proves too much. In
See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland andHistoricalTextualism, 73 MG. L. REV.
969, 972 (2008) ("Nothing in the idea of textualism is inconsistent withthe idea of looking throughout
the entire text for clues to meaning of particular clauses; to the contrary, that is a core component.").
237 M. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1110 (footnotes omitted) (setting forth this argument but then
critiquing it). It merits emphasis that Michael Coenen articulates this potential critique of hybrid rights
(and does so both powerfully and eloquently) without himself endorsing it. It also bears emphasis that
his Article sets forth both this critique and his evaluation of it at significantly greater length than is
captured by the truncated quotation set forth in the text. Finally, it is noteworthy that the quoted passage, as Michael Coenen himself highlights, builds on "Professor John Manning's critique of structuralarguments," as opposed to any preexisting challenge that targets directly the hybrid-rightsmethodology. Id at 1109 (emphasis added). In sum, the quoted passage is not meant (to say the least) to
capture the views of Michael Coenen or of John Manning when it comes to hybrid rights. Instead,
it is offered simply to encapsulate in an abbreviated form one nuanced style of text-based, clausebound critique that some skeptics might direct at judicial recognition of such rights.
235
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the abstract, one might condemn interpreting one ambiguous clause by adverting to another clause on the ground that doing so improperly "extracts . . constitutional principles from a series of . .. textual provisions."238 But if that is
true, then courts may never use the whole-document canon of interpretation because doing so always involves looking beyond "each clause . . itself' in the
interpretive process.239 As we have seen, however, the whole-document interpretive canon is a longstanding and entirely sensible feature of our law.240 Thus,
there is every reason to view the "bargains and compromises" that produced our
Constitution as including an expectation that courts would honor this canon, rather than brush it aside, in the process of dealing with textual ambiguities. 2 4 1
Close attention to the quoted text reveals another point too. No one can
doubt that the "bargains and compromises" argument has some legitimacy
when directed at wide-open efforts to derive hybrid rights (or other limiting
principles) from constitutional "structures" or "penumbras." 242 As we have
seen, however, there is a game-changing difference between the textually problematic "structural" or "penumbral" theory of hybrid rights and the textually
grounded read-one-text-in-light-of-another theory that is set forth here. Precisely because the latter theory posits that any given hybrid right has its origin
in a single constitutional clause, it makes no sense to say that such a right
reaches beyond (to use the language of the above-quoted passage) the proper
"generality level" of that very clause. 243 When courts combine constitutional
clauses in a "metaphysical" way, concerns about "unfaithful readings of the
text" understandably arise. 2 44 But fidelity to the text is simply not an issue
when a court genuinely focuses on interpreting a single ambiguous constitutional clause by applying to it a long-accepted interpretive canon.

238 Id.
239

Id.

See, e.g., United States v. Heirs of Boisdord, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850) ("In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."). See generally McGinnis, supra note 183
(discussing how the court in Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793), drew on "a general
separation of powers provision" in the Virginia Constitution to help it interpret "clauses that were
more specific but not nevertheless completely clear" and asserting that this form of interpretive reasoning was "likely alive and well at the Founding"). For one of many modem articulations of the rule,
see Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319 (2010) ("In sum, '[w]e do not . . construe statutory
phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole."' (quoting United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822,
828 (1984))).
241 M. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1110.
242 Notably in this regard, it turns out that the quoted passage set forth in the text
accompanying
supra note 237 was itself built on work that challenged, and challenged only, so-called "structural"
rules.243See id at 1109-10 (discussing the work of Professor John Manning).
Id. at 1110.
244
Id. at 1095, 1110.
240
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How might sophisticated textualists respond to this your-argumentproves-too-much critique? They might say that, although some uses of wholedocument interpretation are fine, the type of whole-document interpretation
defended here is not. According to this line of thinking, the only proper purpose of whole-document interpretation is to ensure linguistic consistency, and
thus linguistic accuracy, within the document as a whole. Courts, for example,
might rightly look at the Framers' use of the term "the people" in other provisions of the Constitution to determine the meaning of that same term in the
Second Amendment. 245 In similar fashion, courts can and should interpret the
word "necessary" not to mean "absolutely necessary" in light of the contrasting uses of these two terms in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 and Article I,
Section 10, Clause 2.246 These examples of whole-text-based interpretation do
not-so textualist critics might say-support the recognition of hybrid rights.
The derivation of hybrid rights, after all, does not involve merely fostering semantic harmony. Instead, it involves interpreting the contested textual provision by looking to values linked up with another text. This form of wholedocument interpretation, so the argument concludes, is not something that a
proper application of the whole-document canon allows. 247
But why not? To begin with, nothing in the constitutional text states that
reading one constitutional provision in light of another can only take the form
of ensuring linguistic parallelism. 248 Moreover, many considerations support
the adoption of an embracing view of whole-text interpretation, rather than a
tightfisted, semantics-only approach. It is telling, for example, that courts often
have interpreted ambiguous statutory provisions by drawing on values-not
just word usages-connected with companion provisions. 249 This tendency is
245
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-81 (2008); see also Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 27, at 774-75 (discussing how Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade properly used this
technique in identifying the proper meaning of the term "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment).
246
See McCullochv. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 388 (1819) (contrasting U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 18, which empowers Congress to enact all laws "necessary and proper" for carrying other
powers into execution, and id § 10, cl. 2, which prohibits states from imposing imposts or duties on
exports or imports without congressional approval unless "absolutely necessary" to fund inspection
programs).
247 M. Coenen, supra note 17, at 1077 (noting the possibility of applying the whole-text canon
with the aim of discovering "shared semantic features").
248 Zick, supra note 16, at 831 ("[T]he Framers did not make explicit
either in their deliberations or the text itself what the relationship between these rights was or ought to be.").
249 Illustrative of the point is State by Cooper v. French,460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), a case high-

lighted in ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.

GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL

253-54 (2012). That case required the Minnesota Supreme Court to determine whether a statutory prohibition on housing discrimination based on "marital status" barred discrimination against
only married couples or against both married and "unmarried cohabiting couples." French, 460
N.W.2d at 5. The court concluded that the housing law should be read to prohibit discrimination only
against married couples because the substantive public policy reflected in a separate ban on fornicaTEXTS
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far from surprising because courts often look to "public policy considerations"
in interpreting ambiguous statutes,250 and this practice has deep historical
roots. 25 ' Yet, if drawing on public policy considerations to interpret a contested
text would ever seem to make sense, it is when such public-policy considerations stem not only from their intrinsic worthiness, but also from their reification in companion clauses located in the very same instrument that includes the
ambiguous provision.2 52
Whatever conclusions one might draw about the interpretation of statutes,
there are special reasons to take a capacious view of applying the whole-text
canon in constitutional cases. "[W]e must," after all, "never forget, that it is a
constitutionwe are expounding"-not a document with "the prolixity of a legal code," but one as to which "only its great outlines should be marked." 25 3 In
tion supported that result. Id. at 6-7; see also NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1957)
("That § 8(d)(4) [of the Taft-Hartley Act] is susceptible of various interpretations is apparent when
§ 8(d) is read as a whole.... [There is] a 'dual purpose' in the Taft-Hartley Act .... A construction
which serves neither of these aims is to be avoided unless the words Congress has chosen clearly
compel it." (citation omitted) (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 284 (1956)));
MastroPlasticsCorp., 350 U.S. at 285, 287 ("If the above words are read in complete isolation from
their context in the Act, such an interpretation is possible.... [But] [t]he result would... [be] contrary to the purpose of the Act.").
25
Pritchettv. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir. 2005). This point corresponds
with the more general point that the operation of so-called substantive canons is commonplace in
statutory law. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons andFaithfulAgency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109,
109-10 (2010) (detailing "substantive canons [of construction that] advance policies independent of
those expressed in the statute"). Nor is an attentiveness to public-policy concerns limited to interpretation in the public-law context. Reading ambiguous contract terms in light of public policy, for example, is a common practice. See, e.g., Clarkeies Mkt., L.L.C. v. Estate of Kelly (In re Clarkeies Mkt.,
L.L.C.), Nos. 01-10700, 03-1310-JMD, 2004 WL 2745651, at *1, *6 (Bankr. D.N.H. Nov. 29, 2004)
(reading a covenant not to compete narrowly in light of the policy that favors freedom to pursue one's
trade).
251 See Solum, Originaland ConstitutionalConstruction,supra note 187, at 505 (compiling statutory interpretation cases from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries declaring that ambiguous terms should be interpreted (1) in a way "conducive to the public good and the public convenience," (2) to establishjustice when doing so comports with "[t]he general intent of the Legislature,"
and (3) to avoid "inconvenience" and pursue the "equity of the case" (first quoting Board v. Cronk, 6
N.J.L. 119, 120 (1822); then quoting Greenhow v. Buck, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 263, 272 (1816); and then
quoting Braxton v. Winslow, 1 Va. (1 Wash) 31, 32 (1791))); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *90-91 ("Thus if an act of parliament gives a man power to try all causes, that arise
within his manor of Dale; yet, if a cause should arise in which he himself is party, the act is construed
not to extend to that, because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel.").
252 Related to the idea that courts can draw on public-policy considerations in interpreting ambiguous terms is the well-settled principle that courts should considerthe "underlying purposes" of a law
in interpreting its ambiguous provisions. Doherty v. United States, 404 U.S. 28, 36 (1971) (Douglas,
J., concurring). Deciphering such purposes would seem to invite consultation of companion texts, at
least to the extent that a court seeks to honor purposes that underlie the document as a whole. See
supra note 249 and accompanying text (noting the appropriateness of underlying-purpose-based interpretation in connection with the whole-document canon).
253 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
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this respect, the Constitution contrasts sharply with many statutory texts, especially because it ranges across a wide array of important subjects in a necessarily brief and thematic way. 4 As others have recognized, this difference
supports the conclusion that courts should be particularly open to applying the
whole-text canon broadly, rather than narrowly, when they work with the Constitution.2 5 What is more, the case for doing so may be at its highest ebb when
courts deal with constitutional rights, as opposed to issues of federalism and
separation of powers. 256
Longstanding practices of the Supreme Court also support the case for
applying the whole-text canon in a way that reaches beyond simply ensuring
254 See SCALIA, supra note 184, at 37 ("In textual interpretation, context is everything, and the
context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking detail .... ").
255 See, e.g., AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 47 (noting that

"[s]ometimes the key clause in isolation is simply indeterminate," so that "[t]he rule of holistic construction" must be applied, and adding that, although this rule "is itself unwritten," it is "deeply faithful to the written Constitution"); Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 27, at 801 n.204 (highlighting the
potentially different roles of "intratextualism" in statutory and constitutional cases by "focusing on the
Constitution as a compact, cleanly bounded, and easily accessible document, written for ordinary
people and designed to endure over centuries" and noting that these considerations "may not readily
transfer to the realm of statutory interpretation"); Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams: Towarda
Unified Theory of ConstitutionalRights, 28 CARDOzO L. REv. 623, 635 (2006) (drawing onMcCulloch v. Marylandin concluding that "[t]here is even more reason to view a constitution as a unified
whole and to try to give effect to as many of its policies and values as possible"); see also Young,
supra note 230, at 1632 (noting that whole-text interpretation can include an "attempt to situate the
term in question within a broader set of constitutional purposes and principles").
256 Perhaps this is so, for example, because there is a greater need for clarity and certainty regarding basic rules of government operation than the scope of human rights. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (noting that the Court referenced this point in the Rochin v. California).The Ninth
Amendment also provides a possible basis for reaching this same conclusion. That Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Courts and commentators have hesitated to root freestanding individual rights in the Ninth Amendment, in part because as Judge Bork
famously observed its text can be seen as providing no more illumination than an "inkblot." BORK,
TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 27, at 166. But see, e.g., AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CON-

STITUTION, supra note 37, at 6-22 (arguing in effect that the recognition of nontextual rights was
intended by the Framers and is functionally inescapable). Whatever one concludes about a judicial
decisionto "deny" supposed "inkblot" rights, however, the Ninth Amendment separately requires that
the textual recognition of "certain rights . .. not "disparage" such "other[]" rights that are "retainedby
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. This anti-disparagement language mightbe seen as touching on
whole-document hybrid rights in an important way. Onthis view, it is fairto say that wholly foreclosing courts, for example, from consulting the First Amendment in interpreting the Fourth Amendment
(as the Court consulted the First Amendment inRoaden) is to "disparage" the First Amendment because doing so would deny the First Amendment the full effect it otherwise would have pursuant to
the whole-document canon of interpretation. See AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION,
supra note 37, at 99 ("The Ninth Amendment . . instructs us precisely not to read the Sixth Amendment (or any other constitutional listing of rights, for that matter) in a stingy negative-implication,
rights-denying fashion .... "); see also Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1344-45 (relying on the Ninth
Amendment in arguing for judicial openness to engage in structural reasoning no less in rights cases
than in federalism-based sovereign immunity cases).
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linguistic parallelism. As we have seen, for example, the Court often derives
governing doctrines from a generalized treatment of the "structures" of the
Constitution even though that treatment is not "tied to any particular clause of
the Constitution'2 and, most assuredly, does not involve anything like interpreting a "particular clause" to achieve only semantic tidiness. 25 8 The Court's
structural-reasoning cases thus support afortiorithe similarly value-sensitive,
but far more textually grounded and analytically disciplined, identification of
hybrid rights pursuant to whole-document interpretation. 25 9
Readily derived from the Court's past practice is another key point too.
Even the most casual inspection of the Justices' work reveals that interpreting
the Constitution involves a rich process that reaches well beyond merely honoring semantic conventions. For example, the Court often emphasizes the value of fostering legal clarity and judicial workability as it builds out the meaning of contested textual commands. 260 Clarity and workability are wonderful
251 Manning, supra note 229, at 2004; see also John F. Manning, The Supreme Court 2013 Term:
Foreword:The Means of ConstitutionalPower,128 HARV. L. REv. 1, 4, 31 (2014) (emphasizing that
these doctrines, in their operation, "have repeatedly invalidated statutory programs, but not because
those programs violated some particular constitutional provision," but instead because they have involved "freestanding principles" that are not "ultimately tied to the understood meaning of any particular constitutional text" (footnote omitted)).
258 See supra notes 248-251 and accompanying text.
259 Some analysts might challenge this line of reasoning by claiming that the Court's
structuralreasoning cases have dealt only with separation-of-powers and federalism problems. Thus, so the
argument goes, these cases tell us nothing whatsoever about the judicial identification of individual
rights, including hybrid rights. Any such argument, however, confronts two problems. First, its underlying premise is dubious because the Court in the past sometimes has used structural reasoning to
protect individual rights. See, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44-45 (1867) (recognizing the right of interstate travel). Second, there is no apparent reason and certainly no text-based
reason why structural reasoning should be confined to federalism and separation-of-powers cases.
See generally Denning & Reynolds, supra note 25, at 1102-03, 1108, 1114 (reiterating this argument); Reynolds, supra note 21, at 1338-40 (making this argument at length). Indeed, it seems entirely fair to ask: if courts can use structural reasoning to protect states' rights, why not individual rights
too? Along these same lines, Judge Robert Bork (like many others) challenged the Court's substantive
due process jurisprudence by observing that "[w]here constitutional materials do not clearly specify
[a] value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other."
Robert H. Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand Some FirstAmendmentProblems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971).
This line of reasoning, however, has not prevailed in the Supreme Court. See supranotes 125-126 and
accompanying text. But even if Judge Bork's point has merit, it would seem to support rather than
undermine the whole-document account of hybrid rights presented here. This is the case because, at
least by implication, his theory aligns with the taking of judicial action when the "constitutional materials do . . clearly specify [a] value to be preferred," as when (it would seem) the Court looks to the
value of free speech, as supported by the text of the First Amendment, in interpreting the ambiguous
term "unreasonable" in the Fourth Amendment. Bork, supra, at 8 (emphasis added).
260 E.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675,681-82 (1988) (highlighting the value of the "brightline rule" that requires all questioning to cease immediately once an accused person in custody requests counsel and emphasizing that the rule "has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with
specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation" and that the "gain in speci-
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things to be sure, but attending to them in the process of interpreting the Constitution has nothing to do with adhering to rules of linguistic usage. Rather,
clarity and manageability are values-values that focus largely on promoting
judicial efficiency, providing guidance to government decisionmakers, and
helping to legitimize the distinctive work of courts. And this example presents
only the tip of the iceberg. Why? Because, in gauging the scope of constitutional protections, the Court frequently takes account of fairness-based and
instrumentalist considerations that exist independently of the constitutional
text. 2 61
Policy-based considerations of this kind might have to do with ensuring
the capacity of government to adapt to changing conditions, 262 helping law
enforcement authorities make use of effective investigatory tools, 2 63 or guarding against the creation of a permanent underclass of individuals in the United
States. 264 These examples-and countless others, too-demonstrate that judges
routinely consider substantive values as they interpret ambiguous constitutional commands. Yet, if courts interpreting a disputed provision can draw on nontext-based values of this kind, why should they be foreclosed from drawing on
values that inhere in other clauses located within the very same document that
they are expounding? 2 65

ficity . . has been thought to outweigh the burdens" that can result from excluding probative evidence
(quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979))). Notably, Justice Scalia often laid weight on
this consideration as he dealt with problems of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's replacement of a
"clear constitutional prescription" with a "balancing test").
26 1
See DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 36 (2010) (documenting how the constitutional system parallels the common-law system "in which precedents evolve, shaped by notions of
fairness and good policy"). See generally Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (endorsing
the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause in part because it reflects both
"good sense and sound law").
262
See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 (favoring flexible interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in part because "[t]his . . [C]onstitution [is] intended to endure for ages to
come, and . . to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs").
263 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) (noting the importance to
society of law enforcement efforts to secure confessions in the absence of compulsion).
264
See, e.g., Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982) (relying in part on policy concerns about
creating "a permanent . . . underclass" of residents if tuition-free public education were denied to
undocumented alien children (footnote omitted)).
265 Noteworthy in this regard is the observation made long ago by Justice Story: "In construing
the constitution of the United States, we are, in the first instance, to consider, what are its nature and
objects, its scope and design, as apparent from the structure of the instrument, viewed as a whole, and
also viewed in its component parts." 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED STATES § 183, at 136 (1833). Put simply, resolving textual ambiguity by considering
important "objects" of the Constitution, as made "apparent" by "its component parts" is the mode of
"instrument, viewed as a whole" interpretation endorsed in this Article. Id.
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In any event, when it comes to the values-based use of the wholedocument canon, the precedents reviewed in this Article leave no doubt that
the Court has already crossed the Rubicon. In every case considered herefrom Speiser to Roaden to Smith to Obergefell and on and on-the Court has
done more than consider the semantic relationship of multiple clauses. It has
considered how different clauses interact in light of both their texts and the
underlying values to which they give voice.
In the end, perhaps the most serious claim that a textualist critic of this
reading-one-clause-in-light-of-another theory of hybrid rights can make is that
the Court itself never has explicitly endorsed this approach. Even that claim,
however, is inaccurate, or at least not close to being entirely correct. 266 Indeed,
in Obergefell itself the Court wrote-almost as if it were specifically anticipating the theoretical approach offered here-about how one right "may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other." 267 No less important, this
criticism is beside the point. Courts, after all, often distill from past rulings a
proper set of organizing concepts that thereafter serve to guide decision mak-

The single-clause basis of the Court's Fourth Amendment ruling inRoaden, for example, has
been noted earlier. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. In similar fashion, the Court has
explained that, although due process concerns have helped to give rise to its criminal-appeal-right line
of cases, "[m]ost decisions in this area have rested on an equal protection framework." Bearden v.
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983); see also Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
(deeming anti-picketing law violative of the Equal Protection Clause because "in this case [it] is closely intertwined with First Amendment interests"). Of particular significance, in Golan v. Holder, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, applied in essentially express terms the whole-text approach
sketched out here. 565 U.S. 302, 359 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The issue presented in that case
was whether Congress could afford copyright protection to certain forms of foreign works based on
the power granted to it by the Article I, Section 8 Intellectual Property Clause. Id. at 307-08 (majority
opinion). In construing that text to deny such authority, the dissenters saw no need to "decide whether
the harms to [the alleged infringer's] interest show a violation of the First Amendment." Id. at 359
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Nonetheless the "importance of interpreting the Constitution as a single document" dictated that the Court read the grant of the copyright power narrowly so as to avoid putting it
and "the First Amendment at cross-purposes." Id. at 359-60. The majority rejected this analysis but
only on focused, clause-specific grounds because of its conclusion that the Framers had already
factored free-expression concerns into the Intellectual Property Clause, thus rendering Justice Breyer's
analysis an impermissible form of double-counting. Id. at 327-28 (majority opinion). The important
point is that the majority thus did not in any way reject the appropriateness of applying the wholedocument canon of interpretation in other contexts. For one earlier majority opinion of the Court that
resonates with Justice Breyer's approach in Golan, see United States ex rel. Tothv. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11, 15-20 (1955) (taking a narrow view of Article I congressional power to regulate military forces
with regard to post-service court-martial proceedings, free from federal judicial involvement, in light
of companion constitutional provisions regarding federal court jurisdiction, the independence of federal judges, and various Bill of Rights procedural safeguards).
267 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (making this observation in the assessing the interplay of the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses).
266
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ing in a particular field of law. 2 68 The preceding pages offer just such a distillation of the overarching principles of hybrid-rights law.269 And once one grasps
what a "hybrid right" really is-that is, a right that emanates from a single ambiguous constitutional text whose meaning is informed by a related provision
or related set of provisions located in the same whole document-it becomes
counter-factual to describe such a right as counter-textual. To the contrary, hybrid rights spring from one text, as clarified by another text, and thus they are
not counter-textual at all.
V.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

A final question looms over our subject: Does this new way of understanding hybrid rights make any practical difference? Part IV suggests that this
single-clause-viewed-in-light-of-the-whole-document approach to hybrid
rights should both constrain judicial activism and inject greater manageability
into this field of judicial work.270 Skeptics, however, may want more. How,
they might ask, will this whole-text approach matter as real-world judges decide real-world cases? Limitations of time and space preclude a full-blown
268 See, e.g., Bentonv. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-94 (1969) (justifying incorporation of the
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause based primarily on an increasingly discernible approach
detected in prior cases that broadly supported incorporation of most protections afforded by the Bill of
Rights).
269 Some textualists might also assert that the theory advanced here is nothing but a clever ploy to
convert what are really "freestanding structural arguments" into "holistic textual arguments" by making use of so-called "textual hooks." Colby, Originalism andStructuralArgument,supra note 24, at
1319; see also Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-corruption Principle,94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 402 (2009)
("Efforts to ground the separation-of-powers principle in particular phrases, instead of in the spirit of
the document, end up sounding warped and feeling disingenuous."); Young, supra note 230, at 1624
(claiming that these efforts in fact involve "structural considerations," as opposed to "meaningful
textual analysis"). In this vein, thoughtful commentators have questioned past efforts of text-invoking
analysts to squeeze what seem to be free-floating doctrinal limits into a single ill-fitting word used by
the Framers, such as the word "state," or to find within the Tenth Amendment restraints on federal
action that range far beyond its truism-stating textual dictate that the states reserve all powers not
delegated to Congress. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1940); see, e.g., Colby,
Originalism and StructuralArgument,supra note 24, at 1320-21 (collecting relevant materials). In
contrast, the express constitutional commands discussed here which center on terms such as "unreasonable," "due process," and "equal protection"-cry out for contextual interpretation, so that reading
these terms with an attentiveness to companion provisions is light-years away from proceeding in a
manner that is "awkward," far less "absurd." BOBBITT, supra note 27, at 76; Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1130 (2013). Notably, Professor Thomas Colby
distinguishes between (1) those analysts who take a structural conclusion and seek to squeeze it into
the most suitable text that those analysts can find, and (2) those analysts who start with a genuine
problem of textual ambiguity and then conscientiously make use of the whole-document canon of
interpretation to help resolve it. Colby, OriginalismandStructuralArgument,supra note 24, at 1319.
This Article seeks to show, if nothing else, that work in hybrid-rights cases, if done correctly, falls
comfortably in the latter category.
270 See supra Part IV.
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answer to this question. This Part, however, offers the beginnings of a response
by noting five points-related in large measure to the Supreme Court's seminal
rulings in Griswold, Yoder, and Smith 27 -that illustrate how this reconceptualization of hybrid rights can operate to influence on-the-ground judicial decision making.
First, placing hybrid rights on a long-accepted justificatory footing renders them less susceptible to judicial displacement. The Court has expressed a
willingness to overrule precedents shown not to rest on a stable, underlying
theoretical foundation. 272 But this Article shows why hybrid rights do not, even
remotely, merit this description, and the implications of that conclusion are
significant. In particular, as we have seen, one account of hybrid rights attributes their recognition to judicial extrapolations from the "penumbras" of the
Constitution. But many jurists view this theory of rights as nothing less than
nonsensical. 273 To the extent that such jurists come to sit on the Supreme
Court, the possibility arises that its many past hybrid-rights rulings will become subject to outright overruling, a presumptive vulnerability to overruling,
or at least a line-in-the-sand resistance to any form of rights-expanding development.274 And this is all the more the case if, as some have posited, the present-day Court has become distinctly open to overturning past pronouncements, especially when they are seen as unsupported by originalist principles. 275
The single-clause-based theory of hybrid rights advanced in this Article,
however, disconnects these rights from the much-maligned theory of penumbral-rights recognition. Instead, the single-clause-based theory conjoins hybrid
rights with a long-accepted mode of constitutional interpretation, the widespread acceptance of which should significantly reduce the risk that the Court
See supra notes 25, 90-133 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (recognizing
that, although "the very concept of the rule of law" dictates that "a respect forprecedent is, by definition, indispensable," reconsideration of a past ruling may be warranted when changed times "have
robbed the old rule of significant . .. justification").
273 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
2 74
See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 209-10 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (taking the position, in light of the perceived incompatibility of the dormant Commerce
Clause principle with original understandings, to apply that principle in only two limited scenarios as
a result of stare decisis that is, in any case either involving outright facial discrimination against
interstate commerce or with facts indistinguishable from those of a past ruling in which the law was
declared unconstitutional).
27 5
Erwin Chemerinsky, Does PrecedentMatterto ConservativeJusticeson the Roberts Court?,
A.B.A. J. (June 27, 2019), https://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/chemerinsky-precedent-matterslittle-to-conservatives-on-the-roberts-court [https://perma.cc/E764-5EZG] (asserting, based on decisions handed down during the October 2018 Supreme Court term, that "[s]tare decisis matters little to
the conservative justices" and that "[r]ecent decisions of the Roberts Court indicate that the five conservative Justices will give little deference to precedents that they want to overrule").
271
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will repudiate these rights or work hard to constrain their operation in the future. It may be that the Court will abandon some hybrid-rights precedents
down the line. But the analysis offered here establishes, if nothing else, that the
Court should not overturn these precedents-or even be inclined to overturn
them-simply because they establish so-called hybrid rights.
Second, the analysis set forth here demonstrates why the reasoning of the
majority opinion in Griswold does not provide a proper model for future
rights-related decision making. 276 Put simply, it will not do simply to throw a
variety of rights-related texts against the wall with the aim of extracting from
the resulting Rorschach-like pattern some other right that is not itself set forth
in the Constitution. The whole-document-based approach set forth here provides a better way for assessing the interaction of multiple clauses because this
approach is more structured, more manageable, more restrained, and more
deeply rooted in our Constitution's text and traditions. 2 77
Third, a key step in applying this whole-text-based approach is to distinguish between the single "informed" clause-out of which alone the claimed
right emanates-and the separate "informing" clause, which merely helps illuminate the informed clause's meaning. Critics might worry that the analytical
discipline this method purportedly promotes is illusory because courts, even
while claiming to adhere to it, can simply mix and match constitutional clauses
however they might like in manipulative, self-serving ways. But that is not true.
In Smith, for example, Justice Scalia argued, at least on a very plausible
view of his analysis, that the text of the Free Exercise Clause foreclosed its
application to strike down generally applicable laws. 278 In turn, this reading of
the Free Exercise Clause meant that it could not operate as the "informed"
clause that undergirded the hybrid right attributed to Yoder precisely because
that right does allow litigants to attack generally applicable laws based on their
incidental effects. In other words, the Free Exercise Clause could at most serve
only as an "informing" text that helped give meaning to the "informed" text of
another constitutional provision-in this case the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. And this clarification of the source of the Yoder principle
has significant practical consequences.

276 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying
text (noting the critiques of the reasoning in Griswold v. Connecticut with respect to penumbral
rights).
277 This is not to say that the Supreme Court, despite the majority's problematic analysis in Griswold, reached the wrong result in that case. Indeed, as we have seen, even present-day Justices commonly described as "conservative" have indicated that they view the case as rightly decided, albeit
based on the separate line of analysis put forward in it by Justice Harlan. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying
text.
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In particular, many constitutional analysts have argued that the Court
should abandon the substantive due process principle altogether.279 And if substantive due process were to go out the window, the post-Smith rule of Yoder
would have to go out the window too. After all, on a proper view, that rightsprotecting rule must emanate from the Due Process Clause rather than the First
Amendment according to Justice Scalia's textual analysis. No less important,
even if the substantive due process methodology remains a part of our law, the
Justices surely will look, as they apply that methodology in the hybrid-rights
context, to the same analytical guideposts they consult in other substantive due
process cases. And one ofthose guideposts suggests that courts should proceed
with special caution in building out substantive due process protections. 280
Fourth,this revised understanding of Yoder in the post-Smith world casts
a shadow over the Court's seminal free-exercise ruling in Sherbertv. Verner. 2 8
In Sherbert, the Court held that a state could not deny unemployment compensation to a claimant who left her job because it required reporting to work on
the Sabbath-day of her faith. 28 2 The state law that foreclosed most job-quitters
from claiming unemployment benefits, however, was not designed to target
religious practitioners. In fact, religious practitioners made up only atiny fraction of the disadvantaged job-quitter group. 2 83
As the Court in Smith dealt with Sherbert, it thus faced much the same
question it confronted in dealing with Yoder-namely, whether the rule of
Sherbertcould survive promulgation of a new principle that dictated that generally applicable laws are broadly exempt from Free Exercise Clause attack. In
the end, the Court in Smith salvaged Sherbert, just as surely as it salvaged
Yoder, but it did so based on a very different rationale. Sherbert, Justice Scalia
explained, fell into a special category because the administration of unemployment-compensation programs requires an "individualized governmental
assessment" of each claimant's "particular circumstances" in making casespecific "eligibility" determinations. 2 4 And given the case-by-case-decisionmaking basis of these programs, the state could "not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason." 285 There is a
major problem, however, with this line of analysis if one accepts Justice Scalia's underlying textual analysis of the Free Exercise Clause. Justice Scalia's
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (asserting that the Court has
"always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process" (quoting Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))).
281 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
282
Id. at 404.
283
Id. at 408.
284 Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
285 Id. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
279
280
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textual analysis, after all, indicates that, in order for a law to be one "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment,
that law must specifically target religion for disadvantageous treatment. 286 Yet,
the law in Sherbert involved no such targeting, and it also involved no affront
to due-process-based parenting rights, as did the facts of Yoder.
In sum, neither Sherbert nor Yoder seemed to be reconcilable with the
textual analysis of the Free Exercise Clause put forward in Smith. And only
Yoder, because it implicated parenting rights, could plausibly be reconceptualized as a substantive due process case pursuant to the hybrid-rights methodology developed here. The practical consequence is that, going forward, Sherbert
will be far more vulnerable to a future overruling than Yoder, at least if the
Court locks onto the text-based rationale of Smith itself. Another possibility is
that the intrinsic textual tension between Smith and Sherbert, brought into focus by the Due Process Clause-rooted-hybrid-rights nature of Yoder developed
here, will in time help lead the Court to abandon Smith altogether.
Fifth and finally, the post-Scalia Court may someday reject the rightsnarrowing textual analysis of the First Amendment set forth in Smith and return to viewing the Yoder rule as rightly rooted in the Free Exercise Clause,
rather than the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If the Justices were to take
this tack, however, new questions related to the whole-document theory of hybrid rights would soon arise. The central question would concern the proper
role, if any, that substantive due process principles should play in the Court's
refraining of Yoder as a free-exercise case. On the one hand, the Court might
take a crabbed view of the newly resituated Yoder principle-that is, by continuing to treat Yoder as a hybrid-rights case, but with the Free Exercise Clause
now acting as the operative "informed" clause and the Due Process Clauses,
insofar as they vindicate parental liberty, now having a more limited "informing" role. On the other hand, the Court might abandon its hybridized treatment
of Yoder altogether, in essence returning free-exercise law in full-scale fashion
to its pre-Smith state. 287
The key point is thatthe difference between these two approaches would
be of great consequence. Take, for example, a challenge directed by a local
Amish community to an ordinance that bars horse-drawn farm equipment from
city streets. If the Court's revised, free-exercise-centered approach to Yoder
permitted challenges by religious practitioners to the application of any generally applicable law, this challenge might well succeed. But if the Court's new
approach to Yoder focused instead on reading the Free Exercise Clause in light
of the whole text of the Constitution-with the rooting of parental rights in the
286
287

Id. at 877 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CoNST. amend.
See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
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Due Process Clauses playing a key "informing" role in justifying the Yoder
decision-then the challenge to the farm-equipment law would likely fall flat
because such a law does not implicate parental rights at all.
These five examples shine a light on why the source of hybrid rights matters and, in some cases, matters greatly. The underlying point corresponds with
one of the great aphorisms of the law: "[T]he rule follows where its reason
leads; where the reason stops, there stops the rule." 288 In constitutional law, the
foundational reason-the source-of all, or at least virtually all, governing
rules is the text of the founding charter itself.289 And a constitutional rule that
is ultimately rooted in a single, even if ambiguous, constitutional clause-a
clause with its own linguistic structure, history, and body of precedent-will
inevitably take courts to places that differ from where a free-flowing mishmash of multiple clauses might lead.
CONCLUSION

In law, as in life, less is often more. So it is with hybrid rights. Critics are
sure to decry theories of such rights founded on claims of structural or penumbral inference as convoluted, confusing, and counter-textual-and understandably so. As Professor Donald Regan has observed, "[j]ust as 'nature abhors a
vacuum,' so we are taught to abhor constitutional principles without a specific
textual grounding." 290 Whatever abstract and lofty theories of law might have
to say on this subject, the derivation of meaning from particular legal texts is
the coin of the realm in the actual practice of law. Nor is this surprising. A focus on the operation of identifiable rules derived from identifiable texts-as
opposed to a jumble of "everything that is out there"-seems central to giving
legal work its distinctly legal quality. 291
This Article builds on these ideas by offering a clarifying theory of hybrid
rights-a theory that conceives of any such right as rooted in a particular constitutional provision whose meaning is informed by application of the wholedocument canon of interpretation. This theory coheres with all of the Supreme
Court's past decisions in this field. It also serves to respond to arguments

288 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW AND LAW

SCHOOL 174 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2008) (emphasis omitted).
289 See infra notes 290-291 and accompanying text.
290 Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America andDormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1865, 1889

(1987); see Zick, supra note 16, at 850 ("In the legal academy, as well as inbroaderpublic discourse,
there is a tendency to separate and balkanize constitutional rights.").
291 See Dorf, supra note 193, at 843 ("In our legal culture . .
interpretive arguments unmoored
from text are always vulnerable to being attacked as illegitimate.").
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against the recognition of hybrid rights rooted in concerns about nonoriginalism, judicial excess, unmanageability, and counter-textualism.
The theory offered here posits that every hybrid right-just like every
"ordinary" constitutional right-emanates from one specific and identifiable
constitutional text. To be sure, this approach requires drawing on the Constitution as a whole in determining the meaning of that text. But it also requires that
this interpretive work take place in a specialized and disciplined way. In other
words, it is wrong to discover hybrid rights in the whole document without
more-that is, by way of a highly generalized drawing of inferences about
rights that stand apart from any particular clause pursuant to a full-bore "structural" or "penumbral" methodology.
Instead, when a court considers a hybrid-rights claim, it should look at the
whole constitutional text with the focused goal of finding within it genuinely
illuminating guidance as to the meaning of a particular, but ambiguous, rightscreating provision. Hopefully, this approach will cause courts and lawyers to
view hybrid rights in a new way, relocating them from the jurisprudential frontiers to the heartland of constitutional law. For hybrid rights at bottom are
simply rights-nothing more, but also nothing less.

